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Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the intrinsic preferences of
state appellate court judges. We construct a panel data set using published decisions
from state supreme court cases merged with institutional and biographical information
on all (1,700) state supreme court judges for the 50 states of the United States from
1947 to 1994. We exploit variation in the employment conditions of judges over this
period of time to measure the effect of these changes on a number of measures of
judicial performance. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that judges are
intrinsically motivated to provide high-quality decisions, and that at the margin they
prefer quality over quantity. When judges face less time pressure, they write more
well-researched opinions that are cited more often by later judges. When judges are up
for election then performance falls, consistent with the hypothesis that election politics
is time-consuming. These effects are strongest when judges have more discretion to
select their case portfolio, consistent with psychological theories that posit a negative
effect of contingency on motivation (e.g. Deci, 1971). Finally, the intrinsic preference
for quality appears to be higher among judges selected by non-partisan elections than
among those selected by partisan elections.
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1 Introduction
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical study of the intrinsic motives of state supreme
court judges. We have constructed a panel data set that matches institutional and judge bi-
ographical information with published decisions for all state high courts in the United States
from 1947 until 1994. We document discrete institutional changes in judicial employment
conditions, which either increased or decreased the constraints faced by judges when doing
their work. Our within-judge estimates of the behavioral responses to these changes are con-
sistent with the hypothesis that judges are intrinsically motivated to choose higher-quality
opinions when given more time, and that they intrinsically prefer quality over quantity at
the margin.
This work is important because an independent judiciary is crucial for the operation of
civil society. As Epstein et al. (2013) observe, judges are paid on fixed salaries to reduce
pecuniary motivation that may bias their decision-making. The first open question is whether
and to what extent judges are motivated to provide high-quality decisions – a question which
we are able to answer in the affirmative. Second, there is the controversial issue of how judges
should be retained and in particular whether they should take an active part in fundraising
for re-election (see Spottswood, 2007). We find evidence that in the year a judge is up for
re-election their performance falls, consistent with the hypothesis that campaigning takes
time. We also find evidence that judges elected via a partisan election process (where judges
have party affiliations) have weaker intrinsic motivation to perform than do judges elected
via a non-partisan process.
An important source of intrinsic reward to perform is professionalism (White, 1959).
According to White, professionals are individuals who become personally invested in their
skills and are motivated by the challenge of doing a job well. We show theoretically that if
judges have a preference for working on influential cases, then constraining their choices can
be demotivating and lead to lower performance. This prediction is consistent with work on
contingency and motivation developed in the psychology literature (Deci, 1971).1 Related
work in economics includes Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), who provide some evidence that
monetary incentives can crowd out an intrinsic motivation to bear the costs of a negative
externality to help solve a social problem. The lab experiment results reported in Gneezy
1It is also consistent with career concerns models. Dewatripont et al. (1999b), Francois (2000), and
Prendergast (2007) show that the conclusions of the simple intrinsic motivation model we develop can also
be derived with standard preferences in a more complex dynamic setting. However, concerns about future
promotion have limited importance in our setting, where promotion to a higher court (the U.S. Supreme
Court) is extremely rare, and almost all judges keep their job until retirement unless they lose election.
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and Rustichini (2000) support the notion that intrinsic incentives are blunted by the addition
of performance pay.
An open empirical question is the degree to which crowding out effects extend to profes-
sionals in their day-to-day work. This question has special importance when a professional
is making decisions on behalf of others. For example, physicians are asked to evaluate and
recommend treatments in their patients’ best interests. An important practical question
is whether physicians should receive pecuniary awards for particular treatment decisions,
or whether healthcare organizations should trust in physician professionalism and impose
flat incentives. Good answers to this type of question have evaded empirical researchers
because the healthcare market is complex and dynamic, making it difficult to obtain con-
vincing measures of professionalism and its effect on performance.2 In this paper, we look
at a separate group of highly skilled professionals whose work environment has been stable
for many decades: state appellate court judges.
The job of an appellate court judge is to review trial cases and ensure that the law is
properly applied. For our purposes this is an attractive setting because the basic functions
of the job have not changed much in the last 200 years. Litigants appeal cases where they
feel there has been an error. The judges then choose which cases to hear, and then they
write a decision regarding the merits of each case. From these written decisions we can build
a number of performance measures, such as the number of decisions written in a year, the
length of a decision, and how often a decision is cited by later judges.3 We then estimate
the effect of changes in employment conditions on these performance measures using judge
fixed effects.
To organize our data and interpret our results we extend the legal-realist model in Ep-
stein et al. (2013) to allow for intrinsic rewards from high-quality decision-making.4 In our
model, judges prefer working on important cases that can influence the law in the future.
This additional ingredient is sufficient to reproduce Deci’s (1971) result in the judicial setting
– namely, giving a judge more discretion over the cases they hear increases effort. Besides
providing micro foundations for how extrinsic incentives might crowd out intrinsic motiva-
tion, the model leads our empirical inquiry toward institutional reforms that gave judges
more time to write decisions and more discretion over their work environment.
The first change we study is the introduction of intermediate appellate courts (IAC’s),
2See Chandra et al. (2012) for a model of professionalism for doctors and a discussion of the evidence.
3See Choi et al. (2008) for a discussion of how to measure judicial performance.
4Recent work by economists in a legal-realist tradition includes Glaeser et al. (2001), Gennaioli and
Shleifer (2007), and Baker and Mezzetti (2012).
3
which have the effect of reducing the case load of sitting supreme court judges. We measure
the impact of the rule change by comparing the performance of individual judges before and
after the introduction of an IAC. These judges could respond in various ways to the reduced
workload, including working less (choosing more leisure) or working more intensely on the
cases still on the docket. We find that judges respond to the introduction of an IAC by
focusing on the more interesting cases that are cited more often by later judges. With more
time from the reduced caseload, the judges write longer and more well-researched opinions,
suggesting an intrinsic motivation for their work.
Another implication of the time allocation model is that if judges are engaged in outside
activities that provide income, then increasing income from judging should reduce time
pressure and thus be associated with more and/or higher-quality output. In our data we
find that wage increases have a positive effect on performance, but only in the states where
judges have full discretion over selecting cases for review. In states with less discretion over
their case portfolio, we find no effect of wages on performance. This suggests the importance
of control over the work environment in the operation of intrinsic incentives.
Next we consider the question of term length, meaning the number of years a judge
serves in between elections. An increase in term length reduces the time pressure on the
judge arising from the re-appointment process, for example due to electoral campaigning.
In our sample, we find that a judge responds to a term length increase with higher-quality
judgments and no decline in output as measured by the number of cases or total number of
words written.
This effect of term lengths on performance suggests the influence of electoral processes
on how judges allocate their time. In our data we observe three types of electoral systems.
We have partisan elections (where judges represent different political parties), non-partisan
elections (where judges are not allowed to affiliate with political parties), and uncontested
elections (where sitting judges are automatically placed on the ballot with no competition).
Lim and Snyder (2013) observe that in non-partisan elections, evaluations by state bar
associations have a large effect on voting outcomes relative to partisan elections. The quality
of the judge, rather than their political affiliation, is most salient for the non-partisan-election
voters. In the period of our data, six states moved from non-partisan to uncontested elections,
while nine states moved from partisan to uncontested elections. Under uncontested elections,
only the worst judges are removed by vote and electoral demands are much weaker.
We find that the move from non-partisan to uncontested elections is associated with an
increase in performance as measured by caselaw research and citations, similar to the effects
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of establishing an IAC or increasing term lengths. There is also an increase in the number of
dissenting opinions and the number of decisions over-ruled by the legislature, suggesting that
the judges are acting more independently. In contrast, the move from partisan to uncontested
elections is associated with a weak negative effect on performance. This result is consistent
with the hypothesis that judges selected in partisan elections have a lower intrinsic preference
for the work of judging.
Finally, we explore the dynamic effect of the election process. We compare the per-
formance of a judge in the year they are up for re-election to other years of their tenure.
In years that judges are up for an uncontested election we find no effect on performance,
consistent with the hypothesis that these elections impose weak incentives. In contrast, in
partisan elections we find evidence of a decrease in both output and quality in the election
year, consistent with the hypothesis that election-year politics take time.
In the non-partisan system we observe more nuanced election-year effects. The number
of majority decisions written declines, as with the partisan system. However, there is no
decrease in quality, research, or opinion length. This is consistent with the existence of time
constraints where other judges take on more work when a colleague is up for re-election, and
also consistent with a higher degree of professionalism among judges selected by non-partisan
elections.
In summary, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that judges have intrinsic
motivations that interact with extrinsic incentives to determine the allocation of time across
judging and other activities. More specifically, our results suggest that judges are intrinsically
motivated to choose higher-quality opinions when given more time, and that they intrinsically
prefer quality over quantity at the margin. From an institutional standpoint, our results
support the contention that judicial elections interfere with good judging, rather than reward
it. These findings provide additional empirical support for adding intrinsic motivation to
the standard agency model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the relevant
literature and the contribution of our results to this literature. Section 3 introduces our
model of judicial behavior. The institutional context is discussed in Section 4, followed by a
description of the data (Section 5). The empirical strategy is outlined in Section 6 and the
results are reported in Section 7. Section 8 provides a concluding discussion.
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2 Background
This paper contributes to two distinct literatures. The first is the literature on public sector
employment, where the concern is that use of low powered incentives may result in less
efficient provision of government services (see Francois and Vlassopoulos, 2008). The second
is the large literature on judicial behavior, much of it in political science, that is concerned
with understanding how judges make decisions.5 We discuss each of these in turn.
2.1 Public Sector Incentives
A generic feature of compensation contracts for individuals who are being asked to provide
expert opinion is that compensation is insensitive to the opinion provided. The cost for these
individuals of changing their recommendation is low, so even small rewards for a particular
position can lead to a large distortion in decision-making.6 In 1991 the National Academies
commissioned a report on how to improve compensation policy in government (Milkovich
and Wigdor, 1991), concluding that the distortion costs of performance pay outweighed any
benefits from increased performance. This report contributed to a large literature, beginning
with Kerr (1975), on the dysfunctional behavior that incentive pay can create.
The challenge for economics is how to understand performance in professions where in-
centive pay is weak. Wilensky (1964) explains this as a consequence of “professionalism”
where norms of behavior evolve that create intrinsic incentives – individuals work hard to
provide performance that is evaluated by their peers as high quality. Kreps (1997) intro-
duced this idea into economics, leading to a number of interesting theoretical developments,
including Dewatripont et al. (1999a,b), Besley and Ghatak (2005), and Benabou and Tirole
(2002, 2003, 2006). In Dewatripont et al. (1999a,b), the effort incentive stems from career
concerns – being rewarded with a better job in future periods. In Benabou and Tirole (2003),
extrinsic incentives crowd out intrinsic motivations because they signal that the principal
does not trust the agent.
Francois (2000), Prendergast (2007), Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008), and Delfgaauw
and Dur (2008) apply these ideas to incentives for public officials. These papers are concerned
with how to design public employment contracts under a number of assumptions about the
self-motivation of agents. The corresponding empirical inquiry is to measure the extent to
5See Epstein and Knight (2013) and in particular Epstein et al. (2013) who have a comprehensive review
of the literature.
6This result is so well known in incentive theory that it is not typically presented as a result. Variants of
the result can be traced to D’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979).
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which intrinsic incentives lead public servants to modify their behavior as a function of the
environment.
A substantial body of work has used behavioral experiments on college students to
tease out the effect of intrinsic incentives, beginning with the seminal work of Deci (1971).
Economists have extended this work both in the lab (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000) and
in surveys (Lacetera and Macis, 2010). These papers show that explicit performance pay
can crowd out intrinsic motivation. Gneezy et al. (2011) provide a review of this growing
literature.
The experimental literature has established the existence of intrinsic incentives and illus-
trated how explicit incentives can crowd out intrinsic incentives. The more serious challenge
is to measure this effect in the field using public sector workers. First, one must establish
variation in performance of these workers. For example, Coviello et al. (2011) find that the
way judges organize their time affects their performance. Currie and MacLeod (2013) find in
a large panel of physicians that there is variation in both the quality and nature of medical
decisions.
The next step is to explore how the environment influences behavior. Dal Bo et al.
(2013) conduct a field experiment in which they randomize salaries for public sector job
offers in Mexico. Higher compensation is associated with increased quality of the applicant
pool and better self-motivation among the hired workers. Besley and Coate (2003) find that
appointed regulators are more sensitive to the issues that policy makers care about, while
elected regulators are more pro consumer. These papers illustrate the effect of selection on
intrinsic incentives, a central issue in the political science literature on judging (Knight and
Epstein, 1996).
In this paper we are concerned with the effects of changes in the environment on acting
officials, rather than on the effects of selection. Examples of this approach in looking at
public sector employees includes Mas (2006); he studies the effect of arbitration decisions
on police performance and finds that favorable outcomes lead to better police performance.
Dal Bó and Rossi (2011) find that longer term limits lead to higher effort by Argentine
legislators, consistent with our findings on term length. In a field experiment, Banerjee et al.




One strand of the large literature on judging studies how judicial behavior is formed by
the selection process. For example: How does compensation affect the ability of judges
selected? Klerman and Mahoney (2005) find that in eighteenth-century England, the passage
of statutes giving judges higher salaries was associated with abnormally high returns on stock
equity. Baker (2008) instruments for differences in federal judge salaries by comparing them
to law-partner salaries in the judge’s home state. He finds that these salary differences are
not associated with judicial effort, as measured by tendency to dissent in controversial cases
and time between case filing and case disposition. Choi et al. (2009) use a cross-section of
state supreme court judges to measure the effect of salaries on the quality of judges selected,
and they find only mixed evidence on whether judges with higher salaries perform better, as
measured by the number of opinions written and number of case citations.
A second literature explores the effect of election politics on the preferences of appointed
judges. This work builds on Ferejohn’s (1986) point that election politics provide an incen-
tive mechanism. Tabarrok and Helland (1999) find that electoral incentives increase tort
awards, while Gordon and Huber (2007) find that they lead to harsher criminal sentences.
Shepherd (2009a,b) uses a cross-section of state supreme court decisions to show that judicial
voting reflects the political preferences of the retention principal, and that judges seeking
re-appointment by another branch of government are more likely to favor litigants from that
other branch of government. In a separate cross-section of state supreme court decisions,
Choi et al. (2010) find that elected judges write more opinions while appointed judges write
more heavily cited opinions.
Lim (2013) compares the behavior of elected versus appointed state court trial judges
and finds that as a group appointed judges are more homogeneous and tend to make less
harsh sentencing decisions. Iaryczower et al. (2013) extend this work to allow for common
values and dispersed information among judges, coming to similar conclusions.
The focus of this study is how individual judges modify their behavior as a function
of their environment. This is an important question because it helps us understand how to
obtain the best performance from sitting judges. To model their behavior we follow the legal-
realist approach pioneered by Landes and Posner (1980), and suppose that judges have well-
defined preferences and that they make decisions consistent with those preferences. Recent
work by economists in a legal-realist tradition includes Glaeser et al. (2001), Gennaioli and
Shleifer (2007), and Baker and Mezzetti (2012). Epstein et al. (2013) introduce an elegant
rational choice model of judicial decision-making that explicitly allows for judges to enjoy
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allocating time to their work. We cannot directly observe this satisfaction, and hence it is
difficult to assess its importance. In order to assess the importance of intrinsic motivation
we need to understand how intrinsic motivation affects the outcomes we can observe in our
dataset.
Our dataset consists of state appellate decisions, while Epstein et al. (2013) focus on
the federal courts. The benefit of using data from the states is that we have a greater
variety of treatments across states and across time. Subject to the caveats in Bertrand et al.
(2004), we can view the U.S. states as a collection of “natural experiments” that allows us
to use a quasi-experimental approach to estimate the causal effect of changes in employment
conditions on the behavior of individual judges (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
3 Judicial Preferences
In this section we introduce a model of how judges allocate their time between different
activities as a function of the importance the judges place on these activities. We begin with
a version of the model of Epstein et al. (2013, pp. 25-50) and illustrate how different shocks
to the environment lead to time reallocation. Next, we drill down and put more structure on
intrinsic preferences and derive some testable implications of the theory of professionalism.
Epstein et al.’s (2013) model begins with the observation that the judge’s problem, like
most incentive problems, is to allocate time across activities. In this case, those activities are
leisure, judging cases, and “outside activities” – that is, non-judging activities that increase
(pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary) income. Moonlighting as a private-sector arbitrator or
providing legal representation is rare for appellate judges, and generally forbidden by rules
of judicial conduct. The key example of an outside activity for our purposes is campaigning
for re-election. But as discussed in Epstein et al. (2013), outside activities may include other
political activities such as fundraising for party affiliates, writing books and journal articles,
or guest lecturing at law schools.
It is assumed that the judge allocates time between leisure TL, judging TJ , and outside
activities TA, subject to the constraint:
TL + TJ + TA ≤ T¯ . (3.1)
where T¯ is the time available for the period in question (week, month, or year, for example).
Let ~T = {TL, TJ , TA} denote the vector of time allocations. We suppose that the utility
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function takes a standard Cobb-Douglas form:
U
(
~T , ~α, ~β
)
= UL (TL, αL)βL UJ (TJ , αJ)βJ UA (TA, αA)βA
where the vector of judge preferences ~β = {βL, βJ , βA} includes leisure preference βL, intrinsic
valuing of work on cases βJ , and taste for outside activities βA. The parameters ~α =
{αL, αJ , αA} are used to parametrize the effects of the treatments in our data, as discussed
further below.
The goal of the model will be to explore the implications of changes in ~α under the
hypothesis that the preferences of the judge, ~β, are fixed over time. The way a judge allocates
her time depends on these preferences, which cannot be directly observed. Our approach
is to study within-judge changes over time, which allows us to hold preferences fixed. The
various interventions will be modeled as variations in the parameters αi, i ∈ {L, J,A}.
We make the follow assumptions regarding preferences:
Definition 1. Preferences satisfy continuity and monotonicity if the consumption factors
Ui (Ti, αi) , i ∈ {L, J,A} are strictly positive, twice continuously differentiable, and increasing
for Ti, αi ≥ 0.
The next assumption ensures that a unique solution exists.
Definition 2. Preferences are convex if Ui is concave in Ti for i ∈ {L, J,A}.
Finally, we need a condition to sign the effect of the exogenous parameter.
Definition 3. The parameter αi has a positive effect at Ti if ∂
2ui(Ti,αi)
∂Ti∂αi
> 0, where ui =
log (Ui).
These assumptions ensure that the optimization problem is concave and has a unique so-
lution. The fact that Ui are concave in Ti and the log function is strictly concave implies that
the monotonic transformation of utility, u = log (U) gives use an equivalent representation
of preferences in a linear form that is strictly concave in ~T :
u
(
~T , ~α, ~β
)
= βLuL(TL, αL) + βJuJ(TJ , αJ) + βAuA(TA, αA).









subject to the time constraint (3.1). Our assumptions imply:
Proposition 4. Under the continuity, monotonicity and concavity assumptions, there exists




≥ 0. When αi has a positive












< 0 for j 6= i.
The proof of this proposition is in the appendix.
We can gain a bit more insight into these conditions by defining the price of time, given















In the case of leisure, we assume linear utility that does not depend on αL:
UL (TL) = TL,
which means that µL = 1. Thus, from (3.3), we have that µ = βL/TL. The price of time
is pinned down by the preference for leisure and the time allocated to leisure. As the time
allocated to leisure increases, the price of time decreases, and vice versa.
Our goal is to understand how changes in the environment affect the value of time –
and thereby affect the way judges allocate their time to different activities. In the next two
subsections we consider the time allocation to cases and outside activities.
3.1 Preference for Judging
In this subsection we consider the sub-problem of how to allocate time to cases. This
involves the construction of a representation UJ (TJ , αJ) for the utility from judging. First,
we suppose that there is a continuum of cases indexed by their complexity/legal significance
γ ∈ [0, 1], with distribution given by f (γ). The index γ plays two roles. First, the judges
have discretion to choose which cases to hear, and, second, judges may choose to devote
more time to the difficult or more important cases. The level of judge discretion in reviewing
cases may vary across jurisdictions.
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The total number of possible cases is given by N =
∫ 1
0 f(γ)dγ, where the scale can be
normalized as desired. Time spent on case γ is given by t (γ). We suppose that there is a
minimal amount of time needed for each case given by t0 > 0. We define δ (γ)=t (γ)− t0 as
the amount of time above the minimum to deal with a case.
Each case is assumed to have a basic value to the judge of V0, which includes the motiva-
tion to clear a backlog of cases, not to be seen as lazy, etc. The observation that many judges
are given discretion over their case portfolio yet choose to write more than the minimum
number of opinions justifies the assumption that V0 > 0. In addition, judges may have an
intrinsic or reputational motivation to work on cases of legal significance, which we formalize
as follows. Formally, the value of case γ is given by:
V (t (γ) , γ) = V0 + λV1 (δ (γ) , γ) .
The parameter λ represents the weight that the judge places on the intrinsic legal interest in
a case, given by V1(·). This value can vary across judges and has two interpretations. First,
some judges may simply have stronger preferences for quality and get more enjoyment or
satisfaction from the legal work on a hard case. Second, there could be institutional rewards
to quality, such as administrative review by a merit commission. A major goal of the project
is simply to determine if λ > 0; that is, whether or not there is evidence of professionalism
(Wilensky, 1964).
We suppose that judges have a stronger intrinsic motivation to work on the legally im-
portant cases. To capture this idea it is assumed that for all γ ∈ [0, 1] , δ ≥ 0, V1 is twice
continuously differentiable and that:















The second condition ensures that should a judge choose to hear a case, then it is always
optimal to put more than t0 units of effort into a case (δ(γ) > 0,∀γ ∈ [0, 1]). An interior
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solution is not necessary, but it saves on having to keep track of corner solutions where the
judge chooses δ = 0. The last condition says that the intrinsic incentive to invest time is
greater for higher γ – that is, judges care more about the relatively important cases. These
assumptions are sufficient to ensure that judges would choose to hear cases with high γ first.
In states with the death penalty, the supreme court is constitutionally required to review
death penalty cases. In some jurisdictions, such mandatory review rules apply to some or
all types of appealed cases – for example, cases involving constitutional questions, or felony
criminal cases. We suppose that the parameter αJ ∈ [0, 1] represents the fraction of cases
that a judge has discretion whether to hear or not, while (1 − αJ) is the fraction of cases
that must be heard.
Let γ ∈ [0, 1] be the lower bound to the cases a judge considers under full discretion.
The total gain from the intrinsic value of judging is given by:
VJ (γ, δ (·)) = αJ
1∫
γ




(V0 + λV1 (δ (γ) , γ)) f (γ) dγ.
The first integral represents value from the discretionary cases, while the second integral
represents value from the mandatory cases. The value from allocating time TJ to judging is
the solution to:





(t0 + δ (γ)) f (γ) dγ + (1− αJ)
1∫
0
(t0 + δ (γ)) f (γ) dγ ≤ TJ . (3.5)
The inputs to the model are the strength of intrinsic preference for legal work, λ, the dis-
tribution of cases, f (γ), and the fraction of cases with discretionary review, αJ . A detailed
study of the problem is in the appendix, where we show the following.
Proposition 5. If V0 is sufficiently large then
∂2uJ(TJ ,αJ)
∂TJ∂αJ
> 0. In this case an increase in
discretion for the judge leads to more time allocated to judging and more time per case. The
more important cases have more time allocated to them. Increasing TJ increases the number
of cases heard and the time per case.
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This result provides a theoretical explanation for the demotivating effect of contingency
discussed by Deci (1971). Adding contingencies to a task increases the cost of time, which in
turn leads to less effort in the professional activities that the judge prefers, namely interesting
and important legal cases.
3.2 Preference for Outside Activities
Next we consider the allocation of time to outside activities. We interpret outside activities
in general terms; they include any activity that has a cost or benefit other than judging.
The main example is electoral campaigning and other political activities, which derive from
career concerns about re-appointment. They also include pecuniary activities such as writing
books.
We begin by defining:
UA (TA, αA) = I0 + IA (TA, αA) ≥ 0.
The term I0 is the base income from employment as an appellate judge, while IA (TA, αA)
represents all other forms of non-leisure, non-judging rewards. The parameter αA represents




















For I0 sufficiently large, the first term in the parentheses is greater than the second, meaning







Thus, an increase in the return to outside activities should lead to less time per case and
fewer cases heard. The key example of an increase in αA in our data is being up for re-
election, which makes campaigning activity more valuable. Conversely, reduced electoral
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incentives due to judge-tenure reforms would reduce campaign-related returns αA.












An increase in base income reduces the marginal benefit to time spent on (pecuniary) outside
activities. This should result in less time on outside activities and more time on judging (and
leisure). However, this only occurs if TA > 0, that is, for judges that are currently engaged
in outside activities that produce pecuniary benefits. If TA = 0 then an increase in income
will have no effect.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. With stronger electoral concerns (e.g., being in a re-election year), there
should be a fall in total output. If a judge is engaged in outside activities for pecuniary
returns, then an increase in salary leads to more output and higher-quality decision-making.
In summary, this model builds on the idea that judges allocate time to different activities
in proportion to the return from these activities. If they gain positive reward from allocating
time to interesting cases, then any relaxation of the time budget constraint leads to more
time allocated to cases, and hence should result in higher-quality decisions. These ideas
motivate and organize our empirical work.
The model illustrates that the demotivating effect of contingencies and financial rewards
can be explained as a problem in time management. Contingencies increase the value of
time in other activities, and hence reduce the time that individuals allocate to activities
they prefer. In the case of an appellate judge, constraints on case selection raise the cost of
time and reduce the allocation of effort to important cases. These constraints may have a
negative effect on total performance.
4 Institutional Background
We study state supreme courts. These courts operate as the state judiciary’s analogue to
the U.S. Supreme Court, where judges rule on questions of state law rather than federal
law. These questions arise in cases appealed from lower state courts. The state supreme
court consists of a panel of between five and nine judges, who decide together how to rule
on appeals.
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A case begins when a plaintiff files a lawsuit or a prosecutor indicts a criminal. At trial,
facts are litigated and a judge/jury gives a verdict, which the losing party can appeal. If
the state has an intermediate appeals court, they will then take the case and may affirm,
reverse, or modify the trial verdict. After this intermediate court’s decision (or after the
trial decision when the state does not have an intermediate appellate court), the ruling can
be appealed to the state supreme court.
If the supreme court accepts a case for review, the panel of judges will rehear the case at
oral argument and review the submitted briefs for legal error. Each judge votes whether to
affirm or reverse the lower decision. One of the majority judges writes an opinion explaining
the decision. In rare cases, the state supreme court ruling is appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
This is the institutional context in which we study judicial incentives. Importantly, the
job of a supreme court judge does not change much over the course of the career. A judge
in his first year of work has essentially the same task as a judge in his last. While the state
supreme court judge’s job of reviewing cases and establishing precedent is similar to that
of a U.S. Supreme Court justice, there are important institutional differences between state
supreme courts and the U.S. Supreme Court that provide attractive opportunities for the
empirical study of how employment conditions affect judicial behavior.
[TABLE 1.1 HERE]
We identify the causal relationship between employment conditions and judge perfor-
mance using state laws that reform judicial employment conditions. Our list of reforms is
described in Table 1.1. One of the most common reforms is the establishment of an interme-
diate appellate court (IAC). Intermediate appellate courts significantly filter the set of cases
that supreme court judges have to review. When an intermediate appellate court is operat-
ing, supreme court judges have a lot of help in reviewing cases and have more discretion in
whether to accept cases for review. We expect that the introduction of an intermediate ap-
pellate court will increase the time and discretion available to judges, so they should devote
more time to what they care about. Following the modeling framework, we conceptualize
the IAC treatment as an increase in discretion αJ , which should result in more time spent
on judging by Proposition 5.
Next we have monthly data on individual judge salaries between 1974 and 1994. We add
to existing findings, such as Choi et al. (2009) and Baker (2008), by measuring the within-
judge effect in a panel data framework. This gives us a rich set of variations; as in Mas
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(2006), these discrete compensation changes may result in measurable performance changes.
Following Proposition 6, we predict that increasing base income I0 reduces incentives to
engage in outside activities and therefore may increase time spent on judging work.
Because compensation is not contingent on performance and because impeachment is
rare, the retention process is probably the strongest incentive system facing state appellate
judges. Some state supreme court judges have tenure and some have to face election every
few years. In the states with elections, we observe changes in the length of term of office.
The most straight forward way that we look at the effect of retention incentives is to examine
the effects of changes in this term length. In our sample of years, seven states increased the
term length, while three states decreased the term length. Increasing term lengths reduces
the frequency with which a judge faces re-election, so the effects of election on a judge’s
time allocation will be reduced. Decreasing term lengths should have the opposite effect. In
our model, decreasing electoral incentives corresponds to a decrease in the return to outside
(campaigning) activities α0, which by Proposition 6 should increase time spent on cases and
be reflected in higher quantity and/or quality of output.
Next we have discrete rule changes on how a judge is retained. We observe six types
of retention systems in our data. The three less common retention systems are those that
do not feature judicial elections. In governor retention (five states), the governor decides
whether a judge should be re-appointed at the end of his/her term. With legislative retention
(three states), the state legislature decides by majority vote whether a judge should be re-
appointed. With life tenure (four states), judges cannot be removed except by impeachment.
U.S. Supreme Court Justices have life tenure.
We focus on the three most common judge retention systems, which involve elections.
In partisan elections (22 states), incumbent judges face a challenger, with party affiliations
on the ballot. There are generally two candidates, a Republican and a Democrat, and the
incumbent rarely faces a credible primary challenge. In non-partisan elections (18 states),
incumbent judges face a challenger, but party affiliations are not on the ballot. There are
generally one or two candidates, and the incumbent is not identified as such. In uncontested
elections (19 states), incumbent judges face an up-or-down retention vote with no challenger.7
The different election systems impose different electoral incentives. One important mech-
anism for these incentives is voter behavior. Direct evidence of different vote behavior across
systems is provided by Lim and Snyder (2013), who look at whether voting is correlated with
7Note that in these counts, we include a state in two categories if it changed systems during our panel
period.
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state bar association evaluations of judge performance. They find that in partisan elections,
evaluations are uncorrelated with voting due to party-line voting. In non-partisan elections,
evaluations are highly correlated with vote share and probability of winning. In uncontested
elections, evaluations are correlated with vote share but not probability of winning; un-
challenged judges have de facto tenure. These findings suggest that judges in non-partisan
systems have the strongest incentive to spend time impressing voters (and/or bar association
evaluators). In partisan and uncontested systems, that incentive is weaker. However, judges
in partisan systems also have the demands imposed on them by party organizations, which
could also take away time from judging, especially during campaign season.
In our sample of years, six states moved from non-partisan contested election of judges
to uncontested election of judges, and nine states moved from partisan contested election
of judges to uncontested election of judges. By measuring performance before and after
these changes in tenure status, we can assess whether competitive elections incentivize higher
judging effort, or whether they instead divert effort away from judging. If judges choose high
performance to impress voters or the party organization, then weakening electoral incentives
should reduce judge performance. If instead judges have an intrinsic motivation to choose
high performance and elections take up their time, then weakening electoral incentives should
improve judge performance. This would correspond in our modeling framework to a decrease
in the value to campaigning (αA) after moving to an uncontested system, meaning an increase
in judge performance from Proposition 6. The findings in Lim and Snyder (2013) suggest
that moving from non-partisan to uncontested elections may have a stronger effect on judge
behavior than moving from partisan to uncontested elections.
Another institutional feature that we will find useful is the judicial electoral cycle. Like
U.S. Senators, nontenured state supreme court judges face election on a staggered basis,
where a subset of judges are up for election in any particular election year. We can compare
the performance of judges who are up for election to their colleagues who are not up for
election. In our model, being up for election corresponds to a higher return to campaigning
αA and thereby a reduction in judicial output (again, from Proposition 6).
[TABLE 1.2 HERE]
Besides these institutional changes, there are two key rules of appellate procedure that
will play a role in our empirical analysis. In particular, we consider the rules for how cases
are selected for review by the state supreme court, and the rules for how cases are assigned
to authoring judges once they are accepted for review. These rules are listed in Table 1.2.
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As emphasized in the theory, the judge’s discretion to select cases for review is crucial
to the operation of extrinsic incentives and intrinsic motivation. The central idea is that
with discretionary case selection, intrinsic motivation should play a more important role
in performance because judges have more control over their work environment. We divide
state supreme courts into three categories, depending on whether they have full discretion
in case selection, partial discretion (that is, some cases are mandatory), or fully mandatory
review (that is, all cases must be reviewed to some degree). The U.S. Supreme Court has
fully discretionary review. A line of papers in the political science literature have shown
that while judges have some level of discretion under mandatory review, it nonetheless has
substantial compositional effects on the state supreme court caseload (e.g. Eisenberg and
Miller, 2009).8
We don’t have variation over time within state in the rules for case selection. We study
their importance by examining the relative magnitude and significance of our other treat-
ments depending on the case selection rule. In particular, the establishment of an intermedi-
ate appellate court should have a larger treatment effect under discretionary case selection,
as this gives the supreme court more scope to reduce their caseload.
In terms of the model, this can be thought of as a greater increase in the parameter αJ due
to establishing an IAC under full discretionary relative to partial discretion or mandatory
review. Similarly, for courts with higher review discretion, treatments that reduce the return
to outside activities (αA or increase base income I0) might have a larger positive effect on
judging effort (relative to courts with lower review discretion) since the return to judging
time (relative to leisure time) is greater in those courts.
A second procedural rule that we will find useful is the method of case assignment. At the
U.S. Supreme Court, the Chief Justice assigns cases to authoring judges at his own discretion.
At state supreme courts, however, this is the minority rule followed in just 15 states. In 13
states, cases are randomly assigned to authoring judges. In the remaining 22 states, cases are
assigned on a rotating system, with cases arbitrarily assigned to judges based on their order
on the docket. Christensen et al. (2012) examine these rules for a sample of state supreme
8In practice, the appellate review standards are relatively complex. Splitting the states into three cate-
gories required simplification and some subjective coding decisions. The results on changes in employment
conditions without accounting for review discretion can be summarized as follows. First, the IAC effects
on research and quality are still positive but lose statistical significance. The salary effects shrink and lose
statistical significance. The effects from term length are weaker, but there are still positive and significant
effects on case quality. The effects from the non-partisan-to-uncontested reform are qualitatively the same.
The effects from partisan-to-uncontested are no longer negative – there are no effects from this reform in the
aggregate. The baseline effects of the electoral cycle are mostly unaffected, except that the quality reductions
in partisan systems are smaller.
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court decisions, showing that with discretionary case assignment, case characteristics are
significantly correlated with judge characteristics. This means that when comparing the
performance of judges within the same court to each other, estimates from the discretionary
system will likely be biased. For random assignment and rotating assignment, however, case
characteristics and judge characteristics are only negligibly correlated in Christensen et al.’s
(2012) sample. This means that comparing the performance of judges within the same court
to each other would be empirically valid with random or rotating case assignment. For the
analysis of discrete changes in employment conditions, the case assignment rule does not
play a role because the treatment impacts all judges simultaneously. But for the analysis
of the electoral cycle, we exploit the staggered election cycle and compare judges to their
colleagues using a state-year fixed effect, meaning that restricting our analysis to the random
and rotating systems is important.
We have data on several other institutional changes which are not the focus of the present
paper but are included in the regressions as control variables. Probably the most important
of these is the handful of states that moved from partisan to non-partisan elections. We also
have controls for the establishment of a court administrative office, the establishment of a
mandatory retirement age, changes in the number of judges, when New York moved from
partisan elections to governor retention, and when Pennsylvania moved from single-terms to
uncontested re-election.
5 Data
One contribution of this project is the assembly of a new integrated data set on state appellate
courts. At present, there is extensive data on federal court judges (e.g., Epstein et al., 2013),
but no existing comprehensive panel data on state courts. Existing studies, such as Landes
and Posner (1980), Shepherd (2009b), Tabarrok and Helland (1999), Hall and Bonneau
(2006), Gordon and Huber (2007), Lim (2013), and Iaryczower et al. (2013), ask different
questions and/or use different, shorter time periods. Our data set has a much longer time
period and is more comprehensive. The State Court Data Project had four years of data
(1995-1998), and did not have data on how often cases were cited by later judges. Choi et
al’s (2009, 2010) data included three years of cases (1998-2000). These short time frames
only allow cross-sectional studies of judge behavior. Since our data set spans 48 years of
data (1947-1994) it allows us to use a within-judge identification strategy.
We have constructed three data sets, with three types of data: 1) judge characteristics,
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2) institutional variables, and 3) judicial output measures. We discuss these sets of data in
the next three subsections.
5.1 Judge Characteristics
First we have data on the characteristics of individual judges. A team of research assistants
collected these data from a range of sources and built biographies for each judge in the
sample. The key sources include state court web sites, judge obituaries, and Marquis Who’s
Who. Items that were unavailable from these sources were obtained through interviews of
state court administration staff.
[TABLE 2.1 HERE]
Table 2.1 presents summary means and standard deviations for a collection of judge
variables in our sample. We present separate statistics for the different processes by which the
judges were selected. State supreme court judges are hired in middle age: 53.6 years old on
average. They work as judges for an average of 12 years, are overwhelmingly male, and most
of them resign or retire (rather than earn a promotion, die in office, or lose election). Because
promotion (defined in this table as moving to a federal appeals court or to a governorship)
is so rare, career concerns are likely a limited source of incentive pressure for these judges.
We don’t see any large differences across the electoral systems.
5.2 Institutional Variables
The key changes in institutional treatment variables are listed in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. They
are described in Section 4 above. Summary statistics for these variables by state and year are
listed in Table 2.2. The discrete rule changes are represented in the data as dummy variables
that equal one for the years after the law change and zero for the years before. In almost all
cases, reforms are enacted by voters through ballot referendums administered in November
and officially going into effect the subsequent January. In these cases the dummy variable
would turn on in the year following the vote. In cases where the policy is effective in the
first half of the year, it is coded as turning on in that year. For annual salaries, we give the
weighted average across months. The term length changes are combined in a single variable,
where a term length decrease is represented as a negative one. When Tennessee moved back




The institutional variables were collected from a range of sources. Most of the judge salary
data was obtained from the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), which administers an
annual survey of state judge salaries. These data were error-checked by research assistants.
We use BLS data on prices for regions or MSA’s, when applicable, to adjust for inflation.
The appellate review standards were also collected from the NCSC. The case assignment
rules were taken from Christensen et al. (2012).
The data on discrete rule changes were collected from previous papers on judge election
rules, from the web site judicialselection.us, and from inspection of legislation and constitu-
tional amendments. Hanssen (2004) previously coded the election-system changes, although
there were several errors in his data which we have corrected. The other information, for
example on term lengths, was collected from the court web sites and other historical sources.
5.3 Judicial Performance
Our third set of data are judicial performance measures constructed for judicial opinions.
Here we use performance measures suggested as important by Landes and Posner (1980),
Choi et al. (2010), and Epstein et al. (2013). These include the number of opinions writ-
ten, the length of opinions, the amount of research put into opinions, and the number of
subsequent citations to a judge’s opinions. These data were collected by a team of re-
search assistants from Bloomberg Law (bloomberglaw.com), which has the items we need
presented in a standard format that is amenable to automated parsing. We load the case
text and institutional variables into a PostgreSQL relational database, which is ideally suited
to the simultaneous analysis of large text corpora and structured numerical data. A series of
Python scripts interface with the Postgres database to parse the text, compute performance
measures, and merge with the institutional variables. We export to CSV files for use in
Stata.
Our data is constructed from the universe of opinions published by state supreme courts
between 1947 and 1994. The full sample includes 1,025,461 cases. Many of these cases are
summary orders – certiorari denials, habeas corpus denials, and other brief orders that do
not require a full written opinion. These orders are just a few sentences long and are rarely if
9Treating these changes symmetrically is a strong assumption, but most of our estimates are similar if we
treat them as separate reforms. Statistical significance is lower due to the smaller number of experiments.
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ever cited by future judges. Many states in our sample do not publish these types of orders.
Our interest is in the professionally authored legal precedents that explain the ruling for
future judges, so we exclude summary orders from our empirical analysis. Specifically, we
focus on published majority opinions that are seven or more sentences in length – orders
with six or fewer sentences are removed. This step shrinks the sample to 496,099 majority
opinions. Next, we are interested in the behavior of individual judges across time. We
therefore remove unauthored (per curiam) opinions, as well as the small number of opinions
written by non-supreme-court judges, such as magistrates, commissioners, and other special
sitting judges.10 This step shrinks the sample to 387,905 majority opinions (plus attached
discretionary opinions) written by judges for which we have biographical information. This
divides down to 184.7 cases per state per year and 25 cases per judge per year on average.
The list of performance variables, along with summary statistics, are presented in Tables
2.3 through 2.7. First, we use the number of majority and discretionary opinions written.
At the state supreme court level, whether to accept a case for review is often discretionary,
so if judges accept more cases for review they are taking on more work. Whether to write
a discretionary opinion—a concurrence or a dissent—is always up to the judge’s discretion
and involves willingly taking on more work.
Second, we construct effort statistics from the raw text of a judge’s opinions. An appellate
judge’s output is his writing; a rough measure of increased effort would be increased language
output. Here we rely on the total number of words written during a time period, as well as
a basic opinion length measure – the average number of words per majority opinion written.
We also have a measure of the amount of research a judge engages in – the average length
of the Table of Cases gives the number of previous authorities cited in her opinions.
When using opinion length and caselaw research as effort measures, it’s important to note
that a lot of the raw labor inputs into opinion writing and research are provided by supreme
court clerks. If we see changes in output in response to rule changes, that effect may be
due in part to changes in how the judge manages her clerks. From our interviews with state
supreme court court staff, it seems that the number of clerks per judge remained relatively
constant over the time period of our study. Moreover, the processes of clerk selection and
retention were relatively stable and do not seem to be correlated with changes in other
judicial institutions.
10Our treatment variables are uncorrelated with the number and proportion of per curiam opinions, with
the exception of the establishment of the intermediate appellate court. The proportion of per curiam opinions
goes down after an IAC is established. This reflects that per curiam opinions are on average less important
than authored opinions, and that after an IAC is established the court reviews fewer less important cases.
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Third, we have the number of citations to a judge’s opinions by other judges. In our
data, Bloomberg Law staff attorneys have categorized citations as positive, distinguishing,
or negative. A positive cite is a clear signal that a decision is found useful by a future judge.
A distinguishing cite means that part of the ruling is useful, but needs to be clarified – so
this is perhaps a weaker signal of opinion quality. The significance of a negative citation is
more problematic; the most intuitive interpretation is that a negative cite means a judge
made the wrong decision. On the other hand, negative cites could mean that a judge is being
more creative in his judging and allowing for more experimentation in lawmaking. A final
possibility is that negative cites are just another signal of an opinion’s influence relative to
other opinions, and therefore could serve as an additional quality measure.
Using Bloomberg’s citation analysis features, we can construct more fine-tuned data on
judicial citations. We have information about whether a case is discussed by the future
court (rather than cited without comment) and whether it is directly quoted by the citing
court. These measures can be understood as more direct signals that the citing court finds
the opinion useful. The Out-of-State Cites measure includes positive cites from out-of-state
courts; as noted by Choi et al. (2010) among others, this is perhaps the best quality measure
because the cited case serves as persuasive rather than binding precedent. For all of these
citation measures, however, an important caveat is that the number of cites is a joint measure
of both the importance of a case and the effort of the judge.
Finally, we have the number of cases overruled by later courts and the number of cases
superseded by statute (that is, overruled by the legislature). Higher scores on these measures
might be seen as poor judging, since other judges or branches of government are reversing
their decision. On the other hand, higher scores on these measures might also be inter-




Table 2.3 provides summary statistics for case-level variables. Besides the performance-
related variables just described, this table includes a handful of opinion-level variables that
are not used in the empirical analysis but provide context for the type of work performed by
state supreme court judges. We have the case outcome – affirm, reverse, remand, or modify
– and the main areas of law for each case – civil, criminal, administrative, or constitutional.
The first pair of columns gives statistics for the full sample of cases, while the second pair of
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columns gives statistics for the pruned sample of authored legal opinions, which is the sample
of opinions used in the empirical analysis. As expected, the average opinion in the pruned
sample is longer, more well-researched, more well-cited, and has more discretionary opinions
attached. This reflects that the less important summary orders have been excluded. Table
2.4 gives summary correlations within case for the set of performance measures used in the
empirical analysis. Notably, all of our measures are positively correlated within opinion, some
strongly so. In particular, the fact that negative cites are strongly correlated with positive
cites would support the use of negative cites as an additional signal of opinion quality.
It’s tempting to draw causal inferences from these correlations; after all, a well-researched
opinion is likely to be more well-cited due to its higher-quality research. But there are other
unobserved qualities of opinions that also influence the number of citations, such as the
clarity of the legal reasoning or the novelty of the legal issues presented, which are likely also
correlated with the length of the table of cases. While it is an interesting open empirical
question what case features determine the number of citations, we do not have independent
exogenous variation in particular features of opinions and therefore cannot procure credible
estimates of those effects. Therefore in our empirical analysis we use each performance
variable separately and only as a dependent variable. We remain agnostic about the causal
relationships between the various performance measures.
[TABLE 2.5 HERE]
Table 2.5 aggregates the data by judge year. This level of aggregation is used in the
results reported below because it allows the use of a judge fixed effect and treats a year
of work by an individual judge as the unit of observation. If we used case-level data in
the regressions, then the number of opinions written would skew a judge’s weighting in the
estimates. Also, it makes sense for judges who work many years to count more than judges
who work just a few years. Finally, using years rather than months or quarters is helpful
because we avoid problems associated with seasonal variation in performance, for example
due to vacation time.
The statistical levels observed in the data are not especially relevant to our empirical
analysis. Our coefficient estimates are derived from log specifications and can therefore
be interpreted as proportional changes due to the treatments. That said, one might note
that each of these judges is responsible for a large corpus of output in any given year. The
average number of words written annually, 63,831, is the length of a short novel. On average,
a judge’s opinions for a year are used 43 times by judges in other jurisdictions (Total Out-
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of-State Cites), illustrating that state supreme court judges are influential figures that can
play an important role in the broader legal system.
[TABLE 2.6 HERE]
Table 2.6 reports judge-year summary statistics with separate columns for the three
election systems. States with governor re-appointment, legislative re-appointment, or life
tenure are not included in this table. The election systems are similar on most measures. In
the uncontested merit systems, judges write longer opinions, and they have longer tables of
cases (caselaw research). They are also superseded by statute more often. In the non-partisan
systems, citations per opinion are lower in some categories. These differences in levels of
the performance variables across systems and across judges could be due to differences in
institutional variables, to selection of different judges, or just to unobserved cultural factors
or norms. We cannot say that a specific measure on a particular performance variable
indicates high performance or high quality. Instead, we look at proportional changes in the
variables relative to a judge’s baseline in response to treatment, making the more modest
assumption that higher measures on these variables relative to baseline means higher effort
or quality for a particular judge.
[TABLE 2.7 HERE]
Finally, Table 2.7 reports summary correlations for the performance variables using the
judge-year data set. As with the case-level correlations reported in Table 2.4, the judge-year
correlations indicate that the performance measures are mostly correlated within judge over
time. The multiple measures of output and quality provide multiple signals of the amount
of time a judge spends on his opinions. The important exception in this table is the number
of majority opinions, which is negatively correlated with most of the quality measures. This
suggests that judges face a tradeoff between quantity and quality. These correlations may
reflect that judges with larger caseloads have to sacrifice on quality, or it may just be a case
composition effect where judges with larger caseloads also tend to work on less important
cases. The goal of our empirical work is to discriminate between these types of explanations
using panel data.
6 Empirical Strategy
The core of our empirical approach is to exploit within-judge variation in performance. More
precisely, consider the following setup with three types of data. First, we have judge char-
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acteristics Xi, which include observables such as age, experience, and education, as well as
unobservables such as ability and preferences (These would include λ and ~β from the model).
Second, we have time-varying employment conditions Zit, which generally vary within state
over time but could also vary by judge within state (due to a staggered electoral cycle, for
example). These variables include compensation, rules for appointment and retention, term
length, etc. Third, we have judge performance outcomes Yit, which are constructed from
the sample of judicial opinions as described in Section 5.3. We would like to compare judge
performance under conditions ZA and ZB, such that the causal impact of potential outcome
A compared to B is given by:








where F (·) describes the outcome as a function of the treatment (Z), judge characteristics
(Xi), and time (t).
Previous papers on judicial employment conditions have taken two different approaches to
solving the identification problem. The structural approach, best-known from the industrial
organization literature (e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2010), assumes that the model of judge
behavior is known and that only parameter values are unknown. Two leading applications
of this approach to state supreme court judges are Lim (2013) and Iaryczower et al. (2013).
These types of papers illuminate the relative importance of different mechanisms assuming
that those mechanisms exist, but they cannot demonstrate the existence of causal effects.
A second approach is to estimate cross-sectional effects conditional on observables. The
two leading applications of this approach to state supreme court judges are Choi et al.
(2009) and Choi et al. (2010). This approach assumes that Xi captures all the relevant
characteristics of a judge. Then whenever Xi = Xj, we have that
F (Z,Xi, t) = F (Z,Xj, t) ,∀Z.
If we observe the Z assigned to different judges, we can estimate the causal effect via








and no time variation is needed. The problem with this approach is that judges and courts
may have unobserved characteristics that vary systematically by state. If so, correlation
between performance and employment conditions are not likely to be causal links, but the
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result of differences between the judges selected.
Our solution to the identification problem is to use the panel structure in our data. In-
tuitively, we view the 50 states of the United States as 50 potential experiments. We use
changes in state laws determining judicial employment conditions over time as natural exper-
iments, measuring the changes in judicial performance in response to changes in employment
conditions. Formally, we are interested in measuring:








ZB, Xi, t− 1
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#T (A,B) ,
where T (A,B) is the set of all the judges i and periods t where employment rule ZA prevailed
in period t and employment rule ZB prevailed in period t− 1. We hold fixed as many state-
and judge-level characteristics as possible, with the hope of identifying the causal effect of
the change from ZB to ZA. Bertrand et al. (2004) show that, if one includes state time trends
and time dummies, under relatively weak conditions one can correctly identify the effect of
a change at the state level on individuals in that state. A number of studies have used this
approach in a law-and-economics context, including Miles (2000), Autor et al. (2004), Autor
et al. (2006), MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007), Currie and MacLeod (2008), Carvell et al.
(2012) and Avraham et al. (2013).
Our econometric specification is a linear model estimated by ordinary least squares. We
index records by ist, where we have judge i, state s, year t.11 Our set of judge characteristics,
described in Section 5.1, is represented by Xi. Our vector of treatment variables, described
in Section 5.2, is represented by Zist; what is included varies by regression and is described
in more detail in the results section. We have a set of performance measures Yist, described
in Section 5.3, which are constructed from the sample of opinions written by judge i working
in state s during year t. The outcome variable in our regressions is yist = log(1 + Yist);
coefficients can therefore be interpreted as proportional changes due to reforms.12
Formally, we estimate
yist = TIMEt + JUDGEi + STATEs × t+ Z ′istρ+ ist
where TIMEt is a fixed effect for year t, JUDGEi is a judge fixed effect, and STATEs × t is
11More precisely, it is court s, since Oklahoma and Texas each have two courts of last resort.
12We use 1+Yist to account for zeros in the data; the means of the variables are mostly far from zero. Our
results are robust to using levels or the inverse hyperbolic sine rather than logs of the dependent variable.
The adjusted R2 is usually higher in the logs specification than in levels.
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a state-level linear time trend for state s. The year fixed effect allows for arbitrary national
trends in the performance variable. The judge fixed effect controls for time-invariant state-
level and judge-level characteristics. The state time trends control for preexisting trends in
the performance variable that may be confounded with changes in state laws.13
Consistency requires that, conditional on all other covariates, the treatment variable is
uncorrelated with the error term. There are two arguments in favor of conditional indepen-
dence of rule changes and performance. First, as suggested in Hanssen (2004), amendments
to judge employment contracts are proposed as a result of external political conditions,
rather than in response to judge performance. Second, a majority of voters (or legislators)
have to ratify these amendments, meaning that passage has a random component.14 These
arguments strengthen the notion that changes in employment contracts cause changes in
judging effort, rather than vice versa.
Following Bertrand et al. (2004), we use robust standard errors clustered at the state level,
allowing for heteroskedasticity and for arbitrary correlation of the error term within state
across judges and across time. This is sensible because unobserved shocks to performance
are likely correlated within the same court. This clustering method is necessary for valid
statistical inference.15
7 Results
This section presents our empirical results. We have five sets of results. First, Section 7.1
reports results on establishing an intermediate appellate court. Results on increasing judge
salaries are presented in Section 7.2. The results on extending judge term lengths are in
Section 7.3. Section 7.4 presents the results on changing electoral systems, while Section 7.5
reports the effect of being up for election in various electoral systems.
13Our results are robust to the inclusion of a full set of dummies for years of judge experience, meaning
that the effects are not generated by mechanical changes in judge human capital. The results are robust to
removing the first and last years of each judge’s career, meaning that they are not generated by outliers related
to different case compositions for younger/older judges, or for judges transitioning between positions. Finally,
when we use a fixed effect for a cohort of judges to control for judge turnover, the coefficient estimates have
the same sign but are smaller since many of the effects occur toward the end of the ten-year effect window.
14And indeed, we observe several failed reforms that attempted to make the same changes that we examine
here. We do not observe the same effects on performance as the successful reforms (but it is a small sample
of states).
15Our statistical tests are robust to using two-way clustering by state and year. See Cameron et al. (2011).
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7.1 Effect of an Intermediate Appellate Court
First we look at the effect of introducing an intermediate appellate court (IAC). When an
intermediate appellate court is operating, supreme court judges have a lot of help in reviewing
cases and have more discretion in whether to accept cases for review. Reducing the caseload
should mechanically reduce time demands for the judges, and hence these regressions provide
a robustness check. In terms of the model notation, this reform can be seen as reducing t0,
increasing T¯ , and/or increasing αJ .
Note that in the case of the IAC reform, the assignment to treatment is clearly not
random. These courts were established because the supreme court was overworked, and
anecdotal evidence suggests that the supreme court judges actively lobbied for the lower
court.16 We can measure the effect of the treatment on the judges in these states. But we
can’t make strong external validity claims about the effects of an IAC in states that did not
choose to establish one.
Formally, we estimate
yist = TIMEt + JUDGEi + STATEs × t+ Z¯ ′stρ¯+ Z ′stρ+ ist (7.1)
where TIMEt is a fixed effect for year t, JUDGEi is a judge fixed effect, and STATEs × t
is a state-level linear time trend for state s. The term Z¯st is a vector of indicators equaling
one for the baseline time windows of ten years before and ten years after each of the policy
changes discussed in Section 4. Zst is a vector of treatment indicators for the ten years
after each rule change. Thus, with the inclusion of the judge fixed effects, the estimates for
the elements of ρ can be interpreted as the average difference in within-judge performance
for the ten years after the policy change relative to the ten years before the policy change.
This ten-year-window specification accommodates the average career length of state supreme
court judges – having a longer effect window would give too much weight to the handful of
judges who work on the court for many years before and after the reform. Using a shorter
effect window weakens our effects – it takes a few years for the full effects of the reforms to
materialize.
[TABLE 3.1 HERE]
16For example, the Massachusetts judiciary web site states: “The Supreme Judicial Court’s appellate
caseload had greatly expanded through the late 1950s and 1960s. Expansion was fueled in part by a huge
increase in criminal appeals. . . Supreme Judicial Court Chief Justice Joseph Tauro, with considerable
support and assistance from SJC Clerk John E. Powers, leaders of the Legislative and Executive Branches,
and the state’s bar associations, succeeded in getting an intermediate appellate court established in 1972.”
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Our estimates of the effect of establishing an intermediate appellate court are reported
in Table 3.1. Each coefficient is from a separate regression, with the outcome variable
in the leftmost column and the three subsequent columns including the three estimating
specifications, using different fixed effects and trends. Column 1 estimates the intermediate
appellate court effect by comparing across states within years, basically giving the average
difference in supreme court judge performance between states that have an intermediate
appellate court and those that don’t. Column 2 gives the within-state effect, which compares
how the supreme court as a whole did after establishing the IAC, with both sitting judges
and newly arrived judges. Column 3 gives the within-judge effect, looking only at the average
treatment effect on sitting judges at the time of the rule change.
As expected, adding an intermediate appellate court reduces the number of opinions
written. After the change the supreme court judges are sharing the caseload with a lower
court. Interestingly, the decrease in opinions written does not significantly decrease the
total number of words written because judges are compensating by writing longer majority
opinions. On average, the cases are more well-researched. The longer, more well-researched
opinions are also of higher quality, as measured by positive cites, distinguishing cites, discuss
cites, quoted cites, and out-of-state cites. The increase in negative cites may reflect a greater
level of judicial independence and experimentation, which is consistent with their having
more time and energy in opinion-writing.
As emphasized in the theory, the level of discretion given to state supreme court judges in
selecting cases for review should matter a lot in how they reallocate their time in response to
changes in employment conditions. Therefore we have interacted the effects of the treatments
with the level of discretion given in each state. Formally, we have estimated
yist = TIMEt+JUDGEi+STATEs× t+ Z¯ ′stρ¯+Z ′stρ+γPDZ ′stρPD +γMRZ ′stρMR+ ist (7.2)
where γPDis a dummy equaling one in the partial-discretion states, while γMR is a dummy
equaling one in the mandatory-review states (as described in Section 4 and listed in Table
1.2). These dummies were included as controls in the previous table – and they were signifi-
cant in the sense that model fit improved with their inclusion. The coefficient ρ, reported in
Table 3.1, measures the baseline effect of establishing an intermediate appellate court in the
full-discretion system, while the coefficients ρPD and ρMR respectively give the additional
interacted effects under partial discretion and mandatory review. Note that the differences
in results between the case selection systems do not have a causal interpretation. While the
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theory gives us good reason to believe that discretion matters, these rules do not vary over
time and could be confounded with other court and judge characteristics.
[TABLE 3.2 HERE]
Table 3.2 reports the baseline within-judge effects from Table 3.1 Column 3 along with the
interacted effects by appellate review standard. Note that the number-of-opinions coefficients
are positive – they are not significant, but the difference is proportionally large, consistent
with lower discretion constraining the ability of judges to reduce their caseload in response to
the reform. In turn, some of the effects on quality are reduced – relative to the baseline effect
with full discretion, the IAC effect in partial-discretion states is weaker (that is, negative) for
opinion length, research, and opinion quality. For opinion length, positive cites per opinion,
and discuss cites per opinion, that difference is statistically significant. For mandatory
review, we don’t see much difference compared to full discretion, but there are only three
states in this sample (few states keep fully mandatory review if they have an intermediate
court).17
The effects on per-opinion performance measures in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are potentially
from two sources. First, an IAC increases judge discretion over case selection, so they may
be selecting a set of cases that are more interesting on average. Second, judges may be
putting more effort into the cases left over. The average length, research, and cites might
increase without increases in judge effort just because the set of cases is different. To study
this, we look at how our performance measures change on a fixed number of the most
important cases in a judge’s portfolio, with the idea that higher performance on these cases
is due to higher effort in response to having more time. Specifically, we construct a set of
judge-year performance data using averages from the five lowest-quality opinions and five
highest-quality opinions published for each judge, ranked by the number of positive citations.
This necessitates the exclusion of a handful of judge-years with fewer than ten opinions. If
17For completeness we also ran regressions interacting the establishment of an intermediate appellate court
with the type of retention system in the state. The decrease in number of opinions after an IAC is established
is concentrated strongly in the partisan election states. Partisan judges are also the only ones that reduce
their total number of words written. In light of our other evidence, this could be interpreted as suggesting
that these judges care less about their work and have the strongest desire to reduce their workload when given
more discretion over it. Average majority opinion length and length of the table of cases increase in all of the
systems, although the standard errors are larger in the non-partisan and uncontested systems. The increase
in caselaw research per opinion is actually largest for partisan judges – but likely reflects that they are no
longer reviewing the less important opinions. Among the elected judges, the increase in positive citations
and quoted-in citations are only seen in the non-partisan system. In the partisan system and uncontested
system, there are no effects on these measures. There are mixed results for the other quality measures.
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we observe a change only in the bottom-quality cases, that suggests the IAC effect consists
solely of a change in the composition of cases. If we observe a change in the top-quality cases
as well, that suggests the judges are using their extra time to put more work into important
cases.
[TABLE 3.3 HERE]
The effect of establishing an intermediate appellate court on the bottom five and top
five cases by quality are reported in Table 3.3. As with Table 3.2, we report the interacted
effects by appellate review standard. As expected, the bottom 5 cases (Column 1) show
large increases in most quality measures, reflecting that the less important cases are no
longer being accepted for review and the tail of the distribution is being cut off. In terms of
our model, this is consistent with the analysis of λ and V1(·) where judges rule on the more
important cases first.
The effects on the top 5 cases (Column 2) are weaker, with evidence of higher effort
consisting of longer opinions with longer tables of cases. This suggests that with the extra
time from a reduced caseload, judges are spending more time on their most important cases,
writing longer majority opinions that are more well-researched. For this reform, however,
that extra work does not translate into more citations.
Under partial discretion (Columns 3 and 4), meanwhile, these positive effects are sig-
nificantly weakened, for both bottom-end and top-end cases. Relative to the full discretion
case, these judges do not increase effort as much because their workload is not reduced as
much. For mandatory review (Columns 5 and 6), the effects on the bottom-end cases are
reversed on a few measures. At the top end, we actually see improvements in quality for
the mandatory review states, suggesting that with what extra time they get from the reform
they spend it on their most important cases.
Overall, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that judges have an intrinsic
incentive to do good work. When given more discretion to select cases, judges choose the
more interesting cases that have a stronger impact on the law. When their workload is
reduced due to a smaller caseload, they spend more time working on the cases remaining on
the docket.
7.2 Effects of Judge Salary Changes
In this section we measure the effect of judge salary on judge performance. This analysis is
motivated by Proposition 6, which states that increasing base income I0 should reduce time
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spent on outside activities and thereby increase time spent on judging. We use a standard
panel data setup with annual judge performance data. Specifically, the outcome yist for
judge i in state s at year t is modeled as
yist = TIMEt + JUDGEi + STATEs × t+ ρZst +X ′stβ + ist (7.3)
where TIMEt is a fixed effect for year t, JUDGEi is a judge fixed effect, and STATEs × t
is a state-level linear time trend for state s, Zst is the log real annual salary paid to judges
in state s at year t, and ist is an error term. The set of control variables Xst includes
treatment dummies for all of the institutional reforms listed in Table 1.1 and described
in Section 4. This regression effectively compares deviations from the detrended mean log
salary to deviations from the detrended outcome variable. Outcome variables are in logs, so
coefficients can be interpreted as the predicted percent change in the outcome variable for a
one percent increase in real salary.
[TABLE 4.1 HERE]
Table 4.1 reports the salary results. Column 1, with only year fixed effects, is the closest
specification to that used in Choi et al. (2009). Column 2 gives the within-state effect which
would include the effect of salary increases on sitting judges and the quality of new judges.
For analyzing only the incentive effect, we look at Column 3.
Consider first Column 1, which compares judges across states. There are large and
significant effects. Judges with higher salaries tend to write fewer opinions, but they are
longer and have more citations. In Columns 2 and 3, the effects mostly disappear. This
reflects the unobserved heterogeneity in court rules and in judge characteristics across states,
which are correlated with both salaries and our performance measures. Due to other judge-
level and court-level factors, those judges paid higher salaries are also the ones who write
fewer, better opinions.
However, we do see weak evidence of long-term incentive effects of salary changes. In
particular, both within-state and within-judge, increases in log salary are associated with
increases in positive cites, discuss cites, and quoted cites per opinion. The other measures
are positive as well, although not statistically significant. The within-judge measures are
pretty much identical to the within-state measures, meaning that these are incentive effects
on sitting judges.18
18Interacting salary changes with the retention system shows that there are similar (small positive) effects
of log salary on effort across the different electoral systems.
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As done in Section 7.1 with intermediate appellate courts, we have interacted the effects
of salary changes with the level of review discretion in each state. Specifically, we have
estimated
yist = TIMEt+JUDGEi+STATEs× t+ρZst+ρPDγPDZst+ρMRγMRZst+X ′stβ+ ist (7.4)
where as before, γPDis a dummy equaling one in the partial-discretion states, while γMR is a
dummy equaling one in the mandatory-review states. These dummies were included in the
Table 4.1 regressions, which reported the baseline salary effect for full-discretion states.
[TABLE 4.2 HERE]
Table 4.2 highlights the importance of discretionary review in this result. As Table 3.2
did with IAC’s, this table shows the baseline within-judge effect as well as the interacted
effects with partial discretion and mandatory review. While we see salary-related increases
in opinion quality in the full-discretion states, the judges in mandatory-review states respond
to salary increases by decreasing quality. The effect is statistically negative if you look at
these states individually without interacting them with the full-discretion states.
The effects on time use of relieving time pressure from outside activities is stronger when
a judge has discretion over using his time. One way to interpret this result is that time spent
on judging is less valuable under mandatory review. They have less intrinsic motivation
for their job due to having less control over their work environment, so the leisure effect
is stronger than the intrinsic-motivation effect. We emphasize again, however, that these
differences across the case-selection systems could be due to selection of different judges and
have nothing to do with the incentive effects of the discretion rules.
7.3 Effects of Term Length Changes
Here we estimate the effects of changes in term lengths, as discussed in Section 4. With
a longer (shorter) term of office, judges face weaker (stronger) electoral incentives because
they have to face election less (more) often. Therefore increasing the term of office should
result in judges spending more time on what they care about.
This rule change occurred in ten states in our sample, but it is independently identified
in only eight states due to the co-occurrence of other reforms in two of the states. Of these
states, at the time of the reform Hawaii had governor retention, Vermont had legislative
retention, Kentucky, Montana, and South Dakota had non-partisan elections, Louisiana
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had partisan elections, and Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Maryland had uncontested
elections.19
[TABLE 5.1 HERE]
The results reported in Table 5.1 come from estimating Equation (7.2). As with the IAC
effect in Section 7.1, Column 1 gives the across-state effect, Column 2 the within-state effect,
and Column 3 the within-judge effect. The Column 3 coefficients capture the average effect
of a term length change on all judges who are active at the time the change occurred in each
state relative to the state-specific trend, in the ten years after the policy change, relative to
the ten years before the policy change. As with the IAC regression, dummies for all other
rule changes are included.
As can be seen in Column 3, when judges get more time due to changes in term length,
they respond by increasing opinion quality. While there are no significant effects on number
of opinions and opinion length, there is an increase in caselaw research and an increase
in several of our opinion quality measures. After an increase in the term length, we see
improvements on positive cites, distinguishing cites, discuss cites, quoted cites, and out-of-
state cites. As with the IAC, there is also an increase in negative cites, suggesting that
they are writing opinions that matter, but which are controversial. These estimates are
consistent with the hypothesis that longer terms make intrinsic incentives more powerful,
with the result that judges invest more in the task of opinion writing.
[TABLE 5.2 HERE]
To further explore the importance of discretion over case selection as emphasized in
the model, Table 5.2 gives the baseline within-judge effects from Table 5.1 along with the
interacted effects by appellate review standard. With this reform, the limitations of par-
tial discretion in case selection do not seem to restrict the salutary effect, with these two
states actually demonstrating stronger effort/quality responses in some ways. With the two
mandatory-review states, however, notice the following: The term-length effects on caselaw
research and opinion quality are reversed. They are statistically significantly different, in
19Interacting the term length change with the retention system results in the following observations. The
positive effects on quality are strongest in the governor retention, non-partisan election, and uncontested
election systems. Unlike the other results, there are clear positive effects on quality even in the partisan
election systems, with partisan judges showing the largest increase in caselaw research. The term length
effect is actually negative overall in the legislative retention system (Vermont).
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the negative direction, from the baseline effect in the full-discretion states. Under manda-
tory review, judges have little discretion to set their work load so the operation of intrinsic
motivation is weaker.
7.4 Effects of Election System Changes
This section reports the effect of changing judicial election systems. Like the term length
extension, these reforms weaken extrinsic electoral incentives and give judges more discretion
over their time use. As with the intermediate appellate court effects and term length effects,
the estimates are generated by estimating Equation (7.2). Tables 6.1 and 6.2 report the
results on moving from a non-partisan contested election system to an uncontested election
system, while Tables 7.1 and 7.2 report the results on moving from a partisan contested
election system to an uncontested election system. As we will see, partisanship matters.
[TABLE 6.1 HERE]
As shown in Table 6.1 Column 3, the weakening of electoral incentives associated with
moving from non-partisan to uncontested elections is associated with an increase in perfor-
mance on various measures. While the number of majority opinions doesn’t change, the
number of dissenting opinions does. This means judges are voluntarily taking on more work
to express their legal and policy views. As with the term length increase, caselaw research
increases. There are strong positive effects on the quality of opinions written, as reflected in
positive cites, distinguishing cites, discuss cites, and quoted cites. This suggests that judges
are working harder on opinions they care about.20 Concordantly, the tenured judges are
overruled less often by later courts, perhaps because their opinions are more persuasive.
As with the IAC and term length changes, intriguingly, there are higher negative cites per
opinion. Moreover, the judges are superseded by statutes more often. These results could be
interpreted (along with the increased number of dissents), as greater judicial independence
(as in Choi et al. 2010). Judges now face less pressure to pander to voters and the political
system generally; they decide cases following their own preferences and therefore with more
20Another possible interpretation of the citation results is that the composition of cases changes after the
reform due to political reasons. Elected judges may not want to take cases that are politically controversial,
for example cases about abortion rights. After the reform they take these types of cases and therefore are
cited more often. Given the structure of our data and in particular the absence of a good measure for the
controversy of a case, we can’t satisfactorily test for this possibility. However, we note that the other reforms
– the IAC, term length change, and salary change – do not change the politicization of the supreme court yet
have similar effects on citations. If our results for the election system changes were due to case composition,
we wouldn’t expect to have effects for the non-political reforms.
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variance. In consequence their reasoning will be criticized by future judges and superseded
by voter-driven legislators more often.
[TABLE 6.2 HERE]
Following in the stride of previous sections, Table 6.2 looks at the move from non-partisan
to uncontested elections interacted with the level of appellate review discretion in each of
these states. Looking first to the Partial Discretion column, it seems that the treatment
operated differently on the judges in this state (Maryland). Instead of increasing research
and opinion quality, judges in this state decreased the number of opinions and increased
opinion length. Meanwhile, there don’t seem to be many differences between the mandatory-
review states and the full-discretion states from this treatment, which could mean that the
judges in this set of mandatory-review states have other means besides formal case selection
to control the composition of the case portfolio.
[TABLE 7.1 HERE]
Next we look at the effect of moving from a partisan system to an uncontested system.
Before the reform, partisan politicians selected by the political party apparatus ran for elec-
tion to be state supreme court judges. After the reform, they had de facto tenure; both
political parties and voters had far less influence on judge behavior. As shown in Table
7.1, moving from the partisan system to the uncontested system has no positive effects on
performance – it actually has some negative effects. In particular, there is a statistically
significantly negative within-judge effect on positive cites per opinion, (marginally) distin-
guishing cites per opinion, discuss cites per opinion, and out-of-state cites per opinion. In
response to weakened electoral incentives, performance among these partisan judges actually
falls.
[TABLE 7.2 HERE]
Table 7.2 shows that case review discretion also matters for this reform. The decreases in
quality after the reform are weaker under partial discretion, proportionally if not statistically.
At least by the size of the coefficient, they might even go in the other direction.
There are two main approaches for reconciling the different effects of the non-partisan-
to-uncontested and partisan-to-uncontested reforms. First, we can look to the differences in
electoral incentives imposed by the non-partisan and partisan systems. As shown in Lim and
Snyder (2013), non-partisan contested systems have the most competitive election challenges
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where voters and bar associations pay attention to judge campaigning. In the partisan
system, people vote based on party affiliation rather than judge campaign activities. In the
uncontested system, judges have tenure so there are no campaigning incentives to speak of.
In the non-partisan system, therefore, campaigning and other election-related activities are
more beneficial and judges allocate time away from judging and toward those activities. We
would observe this in the data by the increase in judge performance on moving away from
the non-partisan system, with a zero effect on moving away from the partisan system.
However, we don’t see a zero after the partisan reform – we see a negative, which can’t be
explained just by Lim et al.’s hypothesis. Another hypothesis is that judges selected by the
non-partisan system are different from those selected by a partisan system. On this view,
partisan-selected judges have lower intrinsic preferences for judging. Non-partisan elections,
influenced as they are by bar associations and news editorials, select for more technocratic
judges that do have an intrinsic motivation to increase decision quality when they have
more free time. Thus, when electoral incentives are weakened, non-partisan-selected judges
spend more time on their opinions. Partisan-selected judges under mandatory review are
busy working through the mandatory caseload so there is no effect from tenure. But under
fully discretionary review, opinion quality goes down for partisan-selected judges due to low
intrinsic preference for judging.
7.5 Electoral Cycle Effects
To further study the effects of electoral incentives on judge behavior, we look at how judges
change their behavior over time in response to the election cycle. In particular, we can
exploit the staggered election cycle and compare judges sitting on the same court. The
election schedule is arbitrarily assigned by history, so one can reasonably assume that it is
uncorrelated with other institutional or socioeconomic factors that would affect individual
judge performance. Judges who are up for election have less free time than judges who
are not up for election, so if judges have intrinsic motivation to do their job then they will
spend less time on it when up for election. Moreover, this effect should be weakest in the
uncontested electoral system where judges have de facto tenure.
Formally, we estimate
yist = JUDGEi + STATEs × TIMEt + Z ′istρ+ ist
where JUDGEi is a judge fixed effect,and STATEs × TIMEt is a state-year fixed effect for
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each s and year t. The term Zist = (ZNPist , ZPist, ZUist) is a vector of indicators for each of
the three electoral systems (non-partisan, partisan, and uncontested) that equals one when
judge i is up for election at year t in that system. This regression compares the performance
of judges who are up for election to other judges on the same court that are not up for
election, controlling for judge-specific characteristics and arbitrary state-level trends. As
noted in Section 4, we restrict this analysis to states with random or rotating case assignment
(although this doesn’t matter for the results). In these states, there is less scope for giving
easy cases to the election-cohort judges, so we can interpret changes in output as changes in
effort rather than changes in the types of cases a judge hears.
[TABLE 8.1 HERE]
Table 8.1 reports the results on the performance effect of being up for election, with
three triads of columns representing the fixed-effects specifications. The first set of columns
includes state fixed effects and state trends; the second set of columns includes judge fixed
effects and state trends; the third set of columns includes judge fixed effects and state-year
fixed effects. Within specification, the abbreviations NP, P, and U stand for non-partisan
elections, partisan elections, and uncontested elections, respectively. While the third set of
columns is preferred for measuring the causal effect on judges of being up for election, the
first set of columns is useful because it summarizes the average effect on the whole court
when more judges are up for election in a particular year, relative to trend (although these
coefficients also include other election-year factors unrelated to judicial elections).
First consider the effects in NP3, which give the effect of being up for non-partisan election
relative to other judges on the court. With less time for judging, how do they reorganize their
time? They write (marginally) fewer opinions, significantly fewer dissents, and significantly
fewer total words. They are directly reducing the amount of work done. However, this
change in work level does not affect opinion length, research, or opinion quality; it seems
that they reduce the number of majority and discretionary opinions in order to maintain
the quality of their majority opinions. This could be interpreted as evidence that these
non-partisan-selected judges care about the quality of their opinions. It is also important to
note that these judges are making decisions as a group; judges who are not up for election
are likely picking up some of the slack for their colleagues who are up for election.
Next, examine column P3. As with the non-partisan judges, partisan judges when up for
election reduce the number of opinions written and number of words written. The number
of dissents is not affected, however. Moreover, the length of opinions and caselaw research
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decrease during elections, suggesting that part of the time difference comes out of the work
put into individual opinions. In turn, there are negative measures on some of the per-opinion
citation measures, notably distinguishing cites, discussion cites, quoted cites and out-of-state
cites. When up for election, the partisan judges compromise on quality – unlike their non-
partisan counterparts. This is consistent with the discussion in Section 7.4 about differences
in how these systems select judges.
Finally, consider column U3 on uncontested elections. In contrast to the previous two
columns, we don’t see any statistically significant negatives. If anything, these judges work
a bit harder during their election years, as indicated by an increase in caselaw research and
out-of-state citations. These results reflect that with uncontested retention elections, the
judges have de facto tenure and don’t need to reduce their time allocation to judging based
on the electoral cycle.
[TABLE 8.2 HERE]
As a final empirical analysis, we examine differences in the electoral effect due to manda-
tory case review. Table 8.2 reports these results. There are three sets of columns, but they
are divided up by system and each coefficient is from a regression that includes judge fixed
effects and state-year fixed effects. As with previous sections, we interact the electoral effect
with the appellate-review rule.
In the non-partisan system, the negative effects on majority and dissenting opinions
vanish under reduced discretion – these judges don’t have as much control over their case
portfolios. Correspondingly, the effect on total words written is weaker. With partial discre-
tion, elections have a more negative effect on opinion length and research, perhaps reflecting
the effect of less time to work on the mandatory-review cases.
In the partisan system, under partial discretion the negative effect on number of majority
opinions is weakened to zero. Instead, these states have a strong negative effect on concur-
rences written, which could be another margin of reducing work that the full-discretion
judges accomplish by reducing majority opinions written. Aside from that, there are mostly
zeros in the Partial Discretion column, meaning that the judges in these states reduce work
as much as their full-discretion counterparts.
Finally, in the uncontested system, examining the review-standard coefficients shows
that case selection matters even under de facto tenure. Under mandatory review, the judges
who are up for election write fewer opinions, suggesting that the judges who are not up
for election cover their colleague’s mandatory caseload to some degree. This makes sense
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because even with mandatory appeal, there is generally discretionary assignment of cases
across judges. Like the partisan judges under partial discretion, the tenured judges under
mandatory review reduce their concurrences in response to electoral demands, however weak.
The other estimates are somewhat haphazard and don’t contribute to a clear picture.
8 Discussion
The goal of this paper has been to measure the causal effect of changes in employment
conditions on judicial behavior. Given that judges have low powered incentives that do not
explicitly link pay to performance, a standard agency theory would predict that reducing
incentive pressure would have no effect on behavior. We can reject that hypothesis; the
reduction of time pressure is associated with better-researched opinions that are cited more
often by later judges. When time pressure increases, judges prefer to reduce the number
of opinions written rather than compromise on quality. These findings are consistent with
the view that judges are professionals who care about the quality of their work, and that
at the margin they prefer to maintain high quality at the cost of lower quantity. We have
shown not only that judges have intrinsic values, but also that those values include quality
appellate opinion writing.
We have also shown that the importance of intrinsic motivation depends on the observ-
able characteristics of courts and judges. Discretion over case selection – that is, the level
of control a judge has over his work material – contributes to stronger effects of intrin-
sic motivation, consistent with the early work of Deci (1971). In addition, the politics of
judge appointment seem to matter a lot, with partisan judges responding less well to stronger
tenure than their non-partisan counterparts. This suggests that non-partisan systems, where
expert bar association evaluations are more influential in the electoral process, select for an
intrinsic quality preference more powerfully than partisan systems, where political party
affiliations matter most.
These results provide field evidence for theory work on intrinsic motivation (Benabou and
Tirole, 2003; Prendergast, 2008; Rebitzer and Taylor, 2011). State supreme court judges
are a highly selected group of individuals, concluding a significant career in the law by
serving in one of the most prestigious legal positions in their state. Our results support
the unsurprising claim that state supreme court judges are motivated by professionalism
(White, 1959; Wilensky, 1964), by career concerns (Dewatripont et al., 1999b; Francois,
2000; Prendergast, 2007), or both. Extrinsic incentives that impose time pressure reduce
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judge performance by crowding out intrinsic motivation to do a good job, consistent with
previous empirical work in other settings (Gneezy et al., 2011).
Researchers in law and economics have begun to recognize that what judges care about
matters for their output. For example, Epstein et al. (2013) quote correspondence from
economist Andrei Shleifer:
Consider common law judges who face few prospects of promotion. . . and cannot
be fired or voted out. These judges face almost no incentives. They need to
move cases through, and they need to be not so utterly random that they get
overturned very much. But these are not enormously strict constraints. So what
consequences follow? I think that in this context just about any external or
internal motivation can prove decisive.
We have provided empirical evidence of the interaction between such external and internal
motivations. By demonstrating that judges care about their opinion output, these findings
strengthen the previous empirical studies using features of judicial opinions to measure ju-
dicial performance (e.g., Choi et al., 2010; Epstein et al., 2013). Our results support the
view that both institutional rules and judge preferences are important inputs into a well-
functioning legal system, which might partly explain the significant cross-country variation
in the quality of legal systems (Djankov et al., 2003).
The recent work in behavioral economics has demonstrated a great deal of variation in
individual preferences. In particular, this work has shown that the standard agency model’s
assumption that agents are motivated only by pecuniary returns is a (useful) simplification.21
It remains an open question the extent to which we could design institutions that select
individuals with particular social preferences, and in particular a preference to act in the
public interest.22 Our results suggest that state appellate court judges are one group of
officials where institutions do matter for selection of preferences.
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A Theory Appendix: Solution to Judge Optimization
Problem
A.1 General Case
We begin by considering a general time allocation problem, and then we apply the solution
to the judge’s problem. There are n activities, indexed by i ∈ {1, .., n}. The time allocated
to each activity is given by Ti, with vector representation ~T = {T1, ..., Tn}. Let T¯ > 0 be
the total time available. The gain from each activity is represented by Ui (Ti, αi), with the
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βiui (Ti, αi) . (A.2)
Note that since Ui is (weakly) concave in Ti, then ui is strictly concave in Ti (a strictly
concave function of a concave function is strictly concave). The sum of concave functions is
concave, so u(·) is concave in ~T . The agent faces the following time constraints:
n∑
i=1
Ti ≤ T¯ (A.3)
Ti ≥ 0,∀i. (A.4)
The objective is to allocate time across activities to maximize the payoff function subject to
these constraints.
Existence and uniqueness follow from the standard concave optimization assumptions














Let ~T ∗ (~α) denote the optimum, and let µ∗ (~α) be the associated Lagrange multiplier. Here
we ignore the non-negativity constraints Ti ≥ 0 and consider the conditions for an interior
solution. The first-order condition for Ti is given by:













,∀i 6= j. (A.6)
Next we work out the comparative static conditions. Let J = ∇u be the Jacobian for u
and H be the corresponding Hessian matrix (Hij = ∂
2u
∂Ti∂Tj
). The first order conditions can
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be written in matrix form:  J − µ∗~1
T¯ −~1T ~T ∗
 =,
where ~1 is a vector of ones and T denotes the transpose. We take derivatives with respect














 = ~0. (A.7)




T  H −~1
−~1T 0














 = ~0. (A.8)













The first term on the right-hand side is negative since the objective function is strictly



























> 0. The binding time constraint implies that for some j 6= i we have ∂T ∗j
∂αi
< 0.
From (A.5) this implies ∂µ∗
∂αi





< 0 for all j 6= i such that T ∗j > 0. This completes the proof of Proposition
4.
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A.2 Time Allocation to Cases Sub-problem
The judging sub-problem is the solution to:





(t0 + δ (γ)) f (γ) dγ + (1− αJ)
∫ 1
0
((V0 + λV1 (δ (γ) , γ))) ≤ TJ . (A.11)












((V0 + λV1 (δ (γ) , γ)))− µJ (t0 + δ (γ)) f (γ) dγ
+µJTJ
The first observation is that
∂UJ (TJ)
∂TJ
= µJ . (A.13)
Namely, the multiplier gives us the marginal utility of time allocated to judging. As time
becomes more expensive, then this multiplier is larger, which will have some clear predictions
regarding the allocation of time to cases. The same multiplier appears in each subcase, and
so we can take it as a free parameter that is adjusted so that the total budget constraint is
satisfied. We can write Ti (µJ), for i ∈ {L, J,A}, which are increasing functions of µJ .
Next, the first order condition for the allocation of time to a case is given by:





Notice that the time allocated per case does not vary directly with αJ , only with the value
of time (which in turn is affected by αJ). When λ → 0, the excess time allocated to a case






The time per case falls as time is more constrained.
The first order condition for the number of cases (γ) is given by:
V0 + λV1 (δ∗ (γ∗, µJ) , γ∗)
t0 + δ∗ (γ∗, µJ)
= µJ . (A.15)
This condition is independent of αJ . It says that, at the optimum, the judge is indifferent
between reviewing and not reviewing the marginal case of importance γ. Applying the
envelope theorem and A.14 we get:
∂γ∗
∂µJ




As time becomes more scarce, the judge hears fewer cases (chooses a higher threshold γ).
Also observe that, holding the price of time µJ fixed, increasing λ results in the judge hearing
more cases, as well as spending more time per case.
Finally, since the time constraint is binding, then the utility is equal to the Lagrangian:
UJ (Tj, αJ) = L (δ∗ (γ, µJ (TJ)) , γ∗, µJ (TJ)) ,
where ∂µJ (TJ )
∂TJ
< 0,and µJ is given by (A.13). Then we have the total number of cases as a
function of µJ :
N∗ (µJ , αJ) =
∫ 1
0
f (γ) dγ − αJ
∫ γ∗(µJ )
0








With stricter time constraints or more discretion over case selection, the number of cases
falls.
The total time spent on judging is given by:
TJ (µJ , αJ) =
∫ 1
0
(t0 + δ∗ (γ, µJ)) f (γ) dγ − αJ
∫ γ∗(µJ )
0
(t0 + δ∗ (γ, µJ)) f (γ) dγ. (A.17)
An increase in αJ corresponds to an increase in discretion, and a decrease in time use








We also have the budget constraint:
TJ (µJ , αJ) = TJ .








This is a theoretical explanation for Deci’s (1971) empirical results on the motivating effect
of reducing contingency.
The increase in discretion increases the time spent per case, and since it decreases the
cost of time, then the time per case goes up. The effect on the number of cases is:









There are fewer low quality cases, but more high-quality cases that consume more time.
Finally, when the intrinsic value of judging is low, then there is little variation in time spent
on cases, and variations in the cost of time are reflected mainly in the case load.
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TABLE 1.1
State Supreme Court Employment Conditions Changes
Rule Change Description Successful Policy Changes
Compensation Increase All states
Term Length Increase
Term Length Decrease PA (1968), LA (1974), MD (1976)
Intermediate Appellate 
Court
Before, state supreme court judges re-
viewed a case directly from trial, with 
mandatory review. After, an intermediate 
court reviewed the case first, and the 
court exercised discretionary review.
FL (1956), MI (1963), AZ (1964), NM 
(1965), MD (1966), NC (1967), OK 
(1967), AL (1969), OR (1969), WA (1969), 
CO (1970), MA (1972), KY (1975), IA 
(1976), KS (1976), WI (1977), AR (1978), 
HI (1979), AK (1980), ID (1981), CT 
(1982), MN (1983), VA (1984), ND 
(1987), UT (1987), NE (1990)
Increases in judge annual salary due to 
legislation.
Increase in the length of term of office 
before facing re-election.
IL (1962), HI (1968), IN (1970), MT 
(1972), SD (1972), VT (1974), KY(1975)





Before, judges face a challenger, but 
party affiliations not on ballot. After, 
judges face no challenger.
AZ (1974), WY (1972), FL (1976), MD 
(1976), SD (1980), UT (1985)
Partisan contested to 
uncontested re-election
Before, judges face a challenger with 
party affiliations on ballot. After, judges 
face no challenger.
KA (1958), IA (1962), NE (1962), IL 
(1964), IN (1970), CO (1966), OK (1967), 
TN (1971), NM (1988)
Notes. This table summarizes the changes in state supreme court employment conditions that are used as 
treatments in our empirical analysis. Column 1 names the rule change, Column 2 gives a brief description, and 
Column 3 lists the states that enacted the rule change and the year that they did so. The following reforms are 
not the focus of the analysis but are included as control variables: establishment of a court administrative of-
fice, moving from partisan contested election to nonpartisan contested election, moving from partisan con-
tested election to governor retention, increase in the number of judges, moving from single-terms to uncon-
tested election, and establishment of a mandatory retirement age.
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TABLE 1.2
State Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure









State supreme court judges have full discre-
tion in whether to review most non-death-
penalty cases.
CA, CT, FL, HI, IA, ID, IL, IN, 
LA, MI, MT, NC, NH, NY, OK, 
TN, TX, VA, WA, WI, WV
State supreme court judges have discretionary 
review for some types of cases, but a signifi-
cant proportion of cases require review.
AK, AL, AR, CO, DE, GA, KS, 
KY, MA, MD, MN, MO, NE, NJ, 
NM, OR, PA, RI, SC
State supreme court judges have no discretion 
whether to accept for review; some review is 
always mandatory.
AZ, ME, MS, ND, NV, SD, UT, 
VT, WY
Cases are randomly assigned to authoring 
judges.
ID, LA, MI, MS, NH, NY, OH, SD, 
TN, TX, VA, WA, WI
Cases are assigned to judges on a rotating 
basis.
AL, AK, AR, FL, GA, IL, IA, ME, 
MN, MO, MT, NE, NV, NM, NC, 
ND, OK, RI, SC, UT, VT, WV
The chief justice chooses which judge 
receives each case.
AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, HI, IN, KS, 
KY, MD, MA, NJ, OR, PA, WY
Notes. This table summarizes two dimensions of state court appellate procedure that play a role in our empir-
ical analysis. Column 1 names the rule, Column 2 describes it, and Column 3 lists the states that follow that 
rule in their supreme court.  
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TABLE 2.1
Summary Statistics on Judge Characteristics
All Judges Partisan Election Non-Partisan Election Uncontested Election
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Start Age 53.26 8.44 53.31 8.81 53.01 8.20 52.10 7.74
Career Length 12.69 8.07 12.10 8.31 13.07 8.18 12.99 6.82
Female 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24
Republican 0.39 0.49 0.30 0.46 0.47 0.50 0.33 0.48
Top School 0.15 0.35 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.31
Promoted 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.26
Retire/Resign 0.73 0.44 0.68 0.47 0.75 0.43 0.75 0.43
Died In Office 0.16 0.36 0.20 0.40 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.30
Lost Election 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.18
N 1700 675 388 219
Notes. Biographical information by judge election system. Observation is a judge. “All Judges” column also includes judges selected by governor ap-
pointment and by legislative appointment. Start Age is judge age upon joining the court. Career Length is number of years working on the court, con-
ditional on having left the court before 2014. Female is a dummy for being female. Republican is a dummy for being Republican, conditional on being 
Republican or Democrat. We have party affiliation for 599 judges or 35.2% of the sample. The other 64.8% are independent or we could not find in-
formation on their party affiliation. Top School means the judge attended law school at Yale, Harvard, Columbia, Stanford, or Chicago. Promoted 
means they became a judge on a federal court. Retire/Resign means they left the court voluntarily. Died in Office means they died while sitting on the 
court. Lost Election means they were removed because they lost election. 
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TABLE 2.2
Summary Statistics on Institutional Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Intermediate Appellate Court 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00
Real Salary 621.61 109.96 399.97 1177.73
Number of Judges 6.49 1.27 3.00 9.00
Term Length 8.29 2.60 2.00 21.00
Non-Partisan Elections 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Partisan Elections 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
Uncontested Election 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Governor Retention 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Life Tenure 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Legislative Retention 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Min Age Requirement 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Max Age Requirement 0.57 0.49 0.00 1.00
Partial Discretion 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00
Mandatory Review 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
Random Assignment 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Rotating Assignment 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Notes. Observation is a state-year. Intermediate Appellate Court is a dummy for state-years where the 
court had an IAC operating. Real Salary is deflated by 1984 dollars. Number of Judges is the number of 
judge positions on the court (rather than the number actually sitting due to vacancies). Term Length is the 
number of years in between elections or reappointment. Nonpartisan Election, Partisan Election, Uncon-
tested Election, Governor Retention, Life Tenure, and Legislative Retention are dummies for the methods 
of judge retention described in Section 4. Min Age Requirement is a dummy equaling one in state-years 
that judges have to be above a certain age to join the court. Max Age Requirement is a dummy for state-
years that judges have a mandatory retirement age. Partial Discretion is a dummy for having partial dis-
cretion in selecting cases for review. Mandatory Review is a dummy for having to review all cases. This 
leaves 44.4% of the state-years left over for discretionary review. Random Assignment is a dummy for 
courts that assign cases to judges randomly, and Rotating Assignment is a dummy for courts that assign 




Summary Statistics on Case Characteristics
Full Sample Authored Majority Opinions
Outcome Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Majority Opinion Length (Words) 984.38 1663.96 2228.50 1894.34
Table of Cases Length 9.01 18.58 20.59 24.04
Positive Cites 5.19 19.35 11.74 27.81
Distinguishing Cites 0.77 3.21 1.82 4.82
Negative Cites 0.20 1.05 0.47 1.59
Discuss Cites 1.15 3.39 2.64 4.92
Quoted Cites 1.23 4.88 2.83 7.20
Out-of-State Cites 0.76 3.94 1.73 5.94
Superseded by Statute Cites 0.02 0.17 0.04 0.26
Overruling Cites 0.02 0.38 0.04 0.58
Affirm 0.24 0.41 0.50 0.48
Reverse 0.12 0.31 0.25 0.42
Remand 0.10 0.29 0.20 0.39
Modify 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.23
Civil Law Case 0.28 0.45 0.50 0.50
Criminal Law Case 0.22 0.42 0.30 0.46
Administrative Law Case 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.26
Constitutional Law Case 0.05 0.22 0.10 0.29
Number of Discretionary Opinions 0.10 0.37 0.22 0.53
One Dissent 0.05 0.21 0.10 0.30
Two Dissents 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.11
Three Dissents 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04
One Concurrence 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.22
Two Concurrences 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.07
Three Concurrences 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03
One Concurring/Dissenting Opinion 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.13
Two Concurring/Dissenting Opinions 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04
Number of Observations 1025461 387905
Notes. Means and standard deviations of case data. The first pair of columns are from the full sample of 
cases, while the second pair of columns are from the set of authored majority opinions, at least 7 sen-
tences long, that are used in the empirical analysis. See accompanying text for definitions of variables.
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TABLE 2.4
Summary Correlations of Case Characteristics
Pos Cites Dist Cites Neg Cites Dissents Concurs
Maj. Op. Length 1.000
TOC Length 0.744 1.000
Pos Cites 0.218 0.232 1.000
Dist Cites 0.329 0.350 0.531 1.000
Neg Cites 0.276 0.309 0.462 0.717 1.000
Discuss Cites 0.308 0.314 0.658 0.537 0.412 1.000
Quoted Cites 0.276 0.293 0.752 0.483 0.401 0.682 1.000
Out-State Cites 0.156 0.168 0.353 0.277 0.173 0.398 0.447 1.000
Supersede Cites 0.154 0.176 0.171 0.363 0.328 0.218 0.179 0.098 1.000
Overrule Cites 0.081 0.096 0.056 0.106 0.227 0.068 0.062 0.033 0.059 1.000
Dissents 0.092 0.081 0.075 0.114 0.114 0.125 0.080 0.039 0.057 0.043 1.000















Notes. Observation is a case, N=387,905. Includes majority opinions that are authored by a state supreme court judge and at least seven sentences 
long. See accompanying text for variable definitions.
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TABLE 2.5
Summary Statistics on Judge-Year Performance Variables
Outcome Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of Majority Opinions Written 24.98 16.11 1.00 330.00
Number of Dissents Written 3.76 5.70 0.00 153.00
Number of Concurrences Written 1.84 3.48 0.00 60.00
Total Words Written 63831.30 40462.83 298.00 429770.00
Average Length of Majority Opinion 2485.19 1355.36 47.00 38240.00
Average Length of Table of Cases 22.95 17.07 0.00 557.50
Positive Cites Per Opinion 13.26 13.14 0.00 373.00
Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 2.18 2.78 0.00 51.59
Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.59 0.91 0.00 20.63
Discuss Cites Per Opinion 3.01 2.78 0.00 105.50
Quoted Cites Per Opinion 3.36 4.28 0.00 196.50
Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion 1.86 2.54 0.00 82.43
Cases Overruled 1.08 3.22 0.00 116.00
Cases Superseded by Statute 0.97 1.89 0.00 28.00
Total Positive Cites 293.74 277.46 0.00 6134.00
Total Distinguishing Cites 45.63 56.26 0.00 877.00
Total Negative Cites 11.82 16.12 0.00 246.00
Total Discuss Cites 66.04 54.87 0.00 902.00
Total Quoted Cites 70.86 73.27 0.00 1527.00
Total Out-of-State Cites 43.21 77.26 0.00 2308.00
Total Federal Circuit Cites 16.94 107.92 0.00 3503.00
Notes. Observation is a judge-year, N=15,486. These statistics are constructed from each judge's yearly out-
put of cases.  “Per Opinion” measures are divided by the number of majority opinions written that year. See 
variable definitions in the accompanying text.
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TABLE 2.6
Judge-Year Output Summary Statistics By Election System
Partisan Election Non-Partisan Election Uncontested Election
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Number of Majority Opinions Written 27.73 18.51 23.57 13.99 25.90 16.52
Number of Dissents Written 4.39 6.76 3.46 4.57 4.67 5.89
Number of Concurrences Written 2.04 3.98 1.78 2.75 2.61 4.25
Total Words Written 61290.92 37925.77 63201.24 40107.19 78377.02 44958.05
Average Length of Majority Opinion 2143.13 999.21 2548.67 1189.56 2897.53 1605.04
Average Length of Table of Cases 18.69 12.54 22.15 11.99 29.56 21.90
Positive Cites Per Opinion 13.09 14.28 10.45 6.26 14.78 9.79
Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 1.94 2.57 1.51 1.77 3.39 3.83
Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.63 1.08 0.40 0.54 0.81 1.04
Discuss Cites Per Opinion 2.68 2.50 2.80 1.81 3.55 2.25
Quoted Cites Per Opinion 2.96 3.72 2.58 2.05 3.83 3.21
Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion 2.19 3.42 1.46 0.94 1.83 1.86
Cases Overruled 1.28 3.72 1.03 2.94 1.30 3.39
Cases Superseded by Statute 0.79 1.44 0.74 1.33 1.74 3.01
N 5545 3503 3357
Notes. Observation is a judge-year. These statistics are constructed from each judge's yearly output of cases.  “Per Opinion” measures are di-
vided by the number of majority opinions written that year. See variable definitions in the accompanying text.
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TABLE 2.7
Summary Correlations by Judge-Year Output Measure
# Dis Ops Pos Cites Dist Cites Neg Cites
# Maj Ops 1.000
# Dis Ops 0.216 1.000
# Con Ops 0.197 0.622 1.000
Total Words 0.576 0.435 0.403 1.000
Maj Op Length -0.292 -0.017 0.034 0.368 1.000
TOC Length -0.213 0.007 0.059 0.340 0.811 1.000
Pos Cites -0.177 0.135 0.128 0.126 0.392 0.417 1.000
Dist Cites -0.196 0.100 0.085 0.177 0.426 0.464 0.607 1.000
Neg Cites -0.195 0.099 0.085 0.116 0.352 0.399 0.567 0.866 1.000
Discuss Cites -0.204 0.124 0.157 0.158 0.505 0.511 0.793 0.495 0.426 1.000
Quoted Cites -0.189 0.094 0.099 0.160 0.507 0.553 0.861 0.515 0.445 0.855 1.000

















Notes. Observation is a judge-year, N=15,486. These statistics are constructed from each judge's yearly output of cases.  Citation measures are 
per opinion. See variable definitions in the accompanying text.
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TABLE 3.1
Effect of Reform: Establishment of Intermediate Appellate Court (26 States)
Outcome Variable (1) (2) (3)
Log Number of Majority Opinions Written -0.380** -0.257** -0.222**
(0.1000) (0.0834) (0.0725)
Log Number of Dissents Written -0.231+ -0.125 -0.107+
(0.132) (0.0828) (0.0621)
Log Number of Concurrences Written -0.128 -0.0464 -0.0345
(0.111) (0.0686) (0.0627)
Log Total Words Written -0.263** -0.159* -0.09
(0.0844) (0.0675) (0.0557)
Log Average Length of Majority Opinion 0.116+ 0.0959* 0.134**
(0.0627) (0.0416) (0.0300)
Log Average Length of Table of Cases 0.084 0.0201 0.115**
(0.0920) (0.0579) (0.0383)
Log Positive Cites Per Opinion 0.0239 0.0344 0.0858*
(0.101) (0.0481) (0.0392)
Log Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 0.169 0.110+ 0.112*
(0.124) (0.0650) (0.0536)
Log Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.129 0.119* 0.100*
(0.0789) (0.0480) (0.0415)
Log Discuss Cites Per Opinion -0.0173 0.0442+ 0.0637**
(0.0612) (0.0257) (0.0237)
Log Quoted Cites Per Opinion 0.0762 0.0317 0.0652*
(0.0859) (0.0347) (0.0287)
Log Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion -0.0783 0.0143 0.0420*
(0.0661) (0.0263) (0.0194)
Log Cases Overruled -0.0248 -0.0141 -0.0527
(0.0513) (0.0333) (0.0449)
Log Cases Superseded by Statute -0.0156 -0.0226 0.00691
(0.0735) (0.0473) (0.0416)
Fixed Effects None State Judge
Trends None State State
N= 15,486 judge-years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p 
< .001. Each coefficient is from a separate regression that includes a year fixed effect. The treatment variable 
is a dummy for the ten years after a policy change, and the effect is relative to a baseline that includes the ten 
years before and after the policy change. Treatment dummies include an interaction with whether the court 
has partial discretion or fully mandatory review.
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TABLE 3.2
Effect of Establishing an Intermediate Appellate Court by Discretion Level
Outcome Variable Baseline Effect Partial Discretion Mandatory Review
(26 states) (11 states) (3 states)
Log Number of Majority Opinions Written -0.222** 0.0954 0.164
(0.0725) (0.116) (0.207)
Log Number of Dissents Written -0.107+ 0.0158 0.00994
(0.0621) (0.0719) (0.144)
Log Number of Concurrences Written -0.0345 -0.0171 -0.161*
(0.0627) (0.0705) (0.0730)
Log Total Words Written -0.09 -0.0121 0.152
(0.0557) (0.0807) (0.104)
Log Average Length of Majority Opinion 0.134** -0.109* -0.00518
(0.0300) (0.0522) (0.134)
Log Average Length of Table of Cases 0.115** -0.0455 0.0696
(0.0383) (0.0534) (0.127)
Log Positive Cites Per Opinion 0.0858* -0.159* 0.0431
(0.0392) (0.0625) (0.108)
Log Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 0.112* -0.0629 -0.102
(0.0536) (0.0653) (0.120)
Log Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.100* -0.078 -0.143+
(0.0415) (0.0475) (0.0741)
Log Discuss Cites Per Opinion 0.0637** -0.0970* 0.0432
(0.0237) (0.0400) (0.0880)
Log Quoted Cites Per Opinion 0.0652* -0.0806* 0.0463
(0.0287) (0.0389) (0.105)
Log Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion 0.0420* -0.115 0.0193
(0.0194) (0.0749) (0.0687)
Log Cases Overruled -0.0527 -0.0176 -0.0109
(0.0449) (0.0561) (0.0906)
Log Cases Superseded by Statute 0.00691 -0.0509 0.0994
(0.0416) (0.0652) (0.0618)
N= 15,486 judge-years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p 
< .001. Each row includes coefficients from a regression that includes a year fixed effect, judge fixed effect, 
and state time trend. The baseline effect is a dummy for the ten years after a policy change, and the effect is 
relative to a baseline that includes the ten years before and after the policy change. Partial Discretion gives 
the estimate for the treatment dummy interacted with a dummy for states with partial discretion in case 
selection. Mandatory Review gives the estimate for the treatment dummy interacted with a dummy for states 
with fully mandatory review. Therefore the second and third column give effects that are relative to the states 
in the first column.
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TABLE 3.3
Effect of Establishing an Intermediate Appellate Court on Bottom-Quality and Top-Quality Cases by Discretion Level
Baseline Effect Partial Discretion Mandatory Review
(26 states) (11 states) (3 states)
Bottom 5 Cases Top 5 Cases Bottom 5 Cases Top 5 Cases Bottom 5 Cases Top 5 Cases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Average Length of Majority Opinion 0.151** 0.0689** -0.0661 -0.0904+ -0.0254 0.0704
(0.0361) (0.0228) (0.0672) (0.0454) (0.162) (0.0833)
Log Average Length of Table of Cases 0.158* 0.0616+ -0.00927 -0.0532 0.109 0.150*
(0.0603) (0.0355) (0.0887) (0.0321) (0.173) (0.0685)
Log Positive Cites Per Opinion 0.225** -0.000212 -0.163* -0.189+ 0.0233 0.111+
(0.0729) (0.0304) (0.0790) (0.103) (0.218) (0.0583)
Log Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 0.0455+ -0.00716 -0.0292 0.0246 -0.102* -0.0212
(0.0242) (0.0494) (0.0250) (0.0703) (0.0415) (0.0913)
Log Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.0418* 0.0559 -0.0464* -0.0696 -0.0802** -0.129
(0.0173) (0.0401) (0.0193) (0.0528) (0.0296) (0.0930)
Log Discuss Cites Per Opinion 0.111** -0.00428 -0.062 -0.132+ 0.0534 0.130*
(0.0375) (0.0310) (0.0478) (0.0744) (0.104) (0.0578)
Log Quoted Cites Per Opinion 0.101* -0.0193 -0.0695+ -0.124 0.056 0.128*
(0.0409) (0.0235) (0.0414) (0.0837) (0.124) (0.0558)
Log Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion 0.0496 -0.0202 -0.0306 -0.161 -0.022 0.155**
(0.0346) (0.0368) (0.0414) (0.134) (0.0800) (0.0533)
Log Cases Overruled 0.0359* -0.0111 -0.0467* 0.00896 -0.0103 -0.0174
(0.0139) (0.0219) (0.0188) (0.0384) (0.0213) (0.0665)
Log Cases Superseded by Statute 0.00542 0.0056 -0.00978 -0.0617 0.0101 0.131**
(0.00798) (0.0231) (0.00793) (0.0401) (0.0120) (0.0430)
N= 13,438 judge-years. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Sample restricted to judge-years with at 
least 10 published cases. Sample of cases includes the bottom 5 or top 5 cases for each judge by year, as ranked by the number of positive 
citations. Each row includes coefficients from a regression that includes a year fixed effect, judge fixed effect, and state time trend. The 
baseline effect is a dummy for the ten years after a policy change, and the effect is relative to a baseline include the ten years before and after 
the policy change. Partial Discretion gives the estimate for the treatment dummy interacted with a dummy for states with partial discretion in 
case selection. Mandatory Review gives the estimate for the  dummy interacted with a dummy for states with fully mandatory review. Therefore 
the second and third pairs of columns give effects that are relative to the states in the first pair of columns.
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TABLE 4.1
Effect of Log Real Salary (All States)
Outcome Variable (1) (2) (3)
Log Number of Majority Opinions Written -0.588+ 0.00518 -0.0513
(0.310) (0.285) (0.286)
Log Number of Dissents Written 0.264 -0.585* -0.195
(0.331) (0.220) (0.190)
Log Number of Concurrences Written 0.236 -0.215 -0.0738
(0.302) (0.224) (0.241)
Log Total Words Written 0.165 -0.0615 -0.0892
(0.333) (0.275) (0.297)
Log Average Length of Majority Opinion 0.617* 0.0266 -0.0235
(0.298) (0.109) (0.121)
Log Average Length of Table of Cases 0.428 0.154 0.0887
(0.389) (0.145) (0.132)
Log Positive Cites Per Opinion 1.408** 0.336* 0.319+
(0.477) (0.153) (0.182)
Log Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 1.307* 0.198 0.219
(0.514) (0.155) (0.175)
Log Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.960** 0.124 0.142
(0.268) (0.115) (0.120)
Log Discuss Cites Per Opinion 1.030** 0.308* 0.286+
(0.338) (0.143) (0.162)
Log Quoted Cites Per Opinion 1.255** 0.295+ 0.292+
(0.411) (0.160) (0.174)
Log Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion 0.319 0.107 0.0437
(0.396) (0.129) (0.129)
Log Cases Overruled -0.0639 -0.245 -0.407
(0.271) (0.324) (0.353)
Log Cases Superseded by Statute 0.721* 0.0356 0.0472
(0.353) (0.223) (0.248)
Fixed Effects None State Judge
Trends None State State
N= 15,486 judge-years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p 
< .001. Each coefficient is from a separate regression that includes a year fixed effect and indicators for all 
other treatment variables listed in Table 1.1. The treatment variable is a dummy for the ten years after a policy 
change, and the effect is relative to a baseline that includes the ten years before and after the policy change. 




Effect of Log Real Salary by Level of Review Discretion
Outcome Variable Baseline Effect Partial Discretion Mandatory Review
(50 states) (19 states) (9 states)
Log Number of Majority Opinions Written -0.0513 0.0868 0.135
(0.286) (0.324) (0.306)
Log Number of Dissents Written -0.195 -0.273 0.161
(0.190) (0.254) (0.228)
Log Number of Concurrences Written -0.0738 0.0974 0.166
(0.241) (0.260) (0.333)
Log Total Words Written -0.0892 0.102 0.0889
(0.297) (0.279) (0.446)
Log Average Length of Majority Opinion -0.0235 0.0135 -0.0977
(0.121) (0.172) (0.308)
Log Average Length of Table of Cases 0.0887 0.00739 -0.185
(0.132) (0.168) (0.302)
Log Positive Cites Per Opinion 0.319+ -0.342 -0.963**
(0.182) (0.250) (0.318)
Log Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 0.219 -0.151 -0.264
(0.175) (0.208) (0.222)
Log Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.142 -0.0948 -0.265*
(0.120) (0.118) (0.115)
Log Discuss Cites Per Opinion 0.286+ -0.343+ -0.801*
(0.162) (0.199) (0.301)
Log Quoted Cites Per Opinion 0.292+ -0.239 -0.747**
(0.174) (0.217) (0.263)
Log Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion 0.0437 -0.152 -0.354
(0.129) (0.211) (0.225)
Log Cases Overruled -0.407 -0.0446 0.0106
(0.353) (0.349) (0.387)
Log Cases Superseded by Statute 0.0472 0.0358 -0.113
(0.248) (0.290) (0.296)
N= 15,486 judge-years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p 
< .001. Each row includes coefficients from a regression that includes a year fixed effect, judge fixed effect, 
state time trend, and indicators for all other treatment variables listed in Table 1.1. The baseline effect is a 
dummy for the ten years after a policy change, and the effect is relative to a baseline that includes the ten 
years before and after the policy change. Partial Discretion gives the estimate for the treatment dummy 
interacted with a dummy for states with partial discretion in case selection. Mandatory Review gives the 
estimate for the treatment dummy interacted with a dummy for states with fully mandatory review. Therefore 
the second and third column give effects that are relative to the states in the first column.
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TABLE 5.1
Effect of Reform: Term Length Increase (10 States)
Outcome Variable (1) (2) (3)
Log Number of Majority Opinions Written -0.119 -0.165 -0.132
(0.305) (0.219) (0.227)
Log Number of Dissents Written -0.56 -0.286 -0.163
(0.401) (0.237) (0.211)
Log Number of Concurrences Written -0.647+ -0.293+ -0.154
(0.355) (0.168) (0.136)
Log Total Words Written -0.181 -0.177 -0.106
(0.250) (0.165) (0.197)
Log Average Length of Majority Opinion -0.0227 -0.0267 -0.00917
(0.0992) (0.0916) (0.0554)
Log Average Length of Table of Cases -0.0122 0.0467 0.123**
(0.153) (0.0854) (0.0349)
Log Positive Cites Per Opinion -0.359 0.116* 0.138**
(0.267) (0.0496) (0.0468)
Log Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 0.219 0.212** 0.197**
(0.233) (0.0750) (0.0620)
Log Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.0848 0.131** 0.124**
(0.105) (0.0460) (0.0403)
Log Discuss Cites Per Opinion -0.208 0.111** 0.105**
(0.160) (0.0351) (0.0189)
Log Quoted Cites Per Opinion -0.0701 0.114* 0.125**
(0.202) (0.0555) (0.0368)
Log Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion 0.0545 0.0504 0.0453+
(0.152) (0.0465) (0.0266)
Log Cases Overruled -0.0758 -0.0427 -0.0126
(0.0454) (0.0370) (0.0600)
Log Cases Superseded by Statute -0.0219 0.0146 0.00506
(0.0972) (0.0750) (0.0729)
Fixed Effects None State Judge
Trends None State State
N= 15,486 judge-years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p 
< .001. Each coefficient is from a separate regression that includes a year fixed effect. The treatment variable 
is a dummy for the ten years after a policy change, and the effect is relative to a baseline that includes the ten 
years before and after the policy change. Treatment dummies include an interaction with whether the court 
has partial discretion or fully mandatory review.
68
TABLE 5.2
Effect of Term Length Increase by Level of Review Discretion
Outcome Variable Baseline Effect Partial Discretion Mandatory Review
(10 states) (2 states) (2 states)
Log Number of Majority Opinions Written -0.132 -0.0927 -0.0346
(0.227) (0.260) (0.195)
Log Number of Dissents Written -0.163 -0.236 0.0124
(0.211) (0.205) (0.223)
Log Number of Concurrences Written -0.154 -0.141 0.0977
(0.136) (0.147) (0.114)
Log Total Words Written -0.106 -0.0358 -0.138
(0.197) (0.243) (0.183)
Log Average Length of Majority Opinion -0.00917 0.155+ -0.0562
(0.0554) (0.0811) (0.0622)
Log Average Length of Table of Cases 0.123** 0.0963 -0.196**
(0.0349) (0.0822) (0.0722)
Log Positive Cites Per Opinion 0.138** 0.168+ -0.210**
(0.0468) (0.0878) (0.0672)
Log Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 0.197** 0.0367 -0.105
(0.0620) (0.106) (0.101)
Log Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.124** 0.0686 -0.0824+
(0.0403) (0.0638) (0.0488)
Log Discuss Cites Per Opinion 0.105** 0.0616 -0.107+
(0.0189) (0.0579) (0.0540)
Log Quoted Cites Per Opinion 0.125** 0.151* -0.102*
(0.0368) (0.0657) (0.0431)
Log Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion 0.0453+ 0.00675 -0.0197
(0.0266) (0.101) (0.0529)
Log Cases Overruled -0.0126 0.283** -0.0458
(0.0600) (0.0889) (0.0597)
Log Cases Superseded by Statute 0.00506 0.0874 -0.127
(0.0729) (0.0954) (0.0761)
N= 15,486 judge-years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p 
< .001. Each row includes coefficients from a regression that includes a year fixed effect, judge fixed effect, 
and state time trend. The baseline effect is a dummy for the ten years after a policy change, and the effect is 
relative to a baseline that includes the ten years before and after the policy change. Partial Discretion gives 
the estimate for the treatment dummy interacted with a dummy for states with partial discretion in case 
selection. Mandatory Review gives the estimate for the treatment dummy interacted with a dummy for states 
with fully mandatory review. Therefore the second and third column give effects that are relative to the states 
in the first column.
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TABLE 6.1
Effect of Reform: Non-Partisan Contested Elections to Uncontested Elections (6 States)
Outcome Variable (1) (2) (3)
Log Number of Majority Opinions Written 0.148 0.0603 -0.0631
(0.0906) (0.0700) (0.0582)
Log Number of Dissents Written 0.476* 0.148+ 0.159*
(0.179) (0.0821) (0.0659)
Log Number of Concurrences Written 0.331* -0.00789 -0.00547
(0.139) (0.0570) (0.0574)
Log Total Words Written -0.171* 0.0898 -0.0345
(0.0751) (0.0657) (0.0535)
Log Average Length of Majority Opinion -0.410** 0.00299 -0.0168
(0.0844) (0.0490) (0.0325)
Log Average Length of Table of Cases -0.248* 0.204** 0.232**
(0.100) (0.0457) (0.0338)
Log Positive Cites Per Opinion 0.129 0.174** 0.177**
(0.0793) (0.0434) (0.0373)
Log Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 0.142 0.195** 0.143**
(0.102) (0.0429) (0.0398)
Log Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.0474 0.0998** 0.0629**
(0.0588) (0.0254) (0.0213)
Log Discuss Cites Per Opinion 0.0478 0.0781* 0.0994**
(0.0569) (0.0317) (0.0288)
Log Quoted Cites Per Opinion 0.00515 0.139** 0.115**
(0.0805) (0.0400) (0.0328)
Log Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion -0.0783 0.0357 0.0418
(0.0568) (0.0259) (0.0330)
Log Cases Overruled -0.166* -0.0728+ -0.105*
(0.0794) (0.0408) (0.0476)
Log Cases Superseded by Statute 0.125* 0.159** 0.112*
(0.0481) (0.0415) (0.0429)
Fixed Effects None State Judge
Trends None State State
N= 15,486 judge-years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p 
< .001. Each coefficient is from a separate regression that includes a year fixed effect. The treatment variable 
is a dummy for the ten years after a policy change, and the effect is relative to a baseline that includes the ten 
years before and after the policy change. Treatment dummies include an interaction with whether the court 
has partial discretion or fully mandatory review.
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TABLE 6.2
Effect of Non-Partisan to Uncontested Election Reform by Level of Review Discretion
Outcome Variable Baseline Effect Partial Discretion Mandatory Review
(6 states) (1 state) (4 states)
Log Number of Majority Opinions Written -0.0631 -0.391 0.0336
(0.0582) (0.275) (0.129)
Log Number of Dissents Written 0.159* -0.323 -0.157+
(0.0659) (0.256) (0.0908)
Log Number of Concurrences Written -0.00547 -0.23 0.153
(0.0574) (0.165) (0.120)
Log Total Words Written -0.0345 -0.209 0.066
(0.0535) (0.229) (0.0787)
Log Average Length of Majority Opinion -0.0168 0.141+ 0.0614
(0.0325) (0.0729) (0.0864)
Log Average Length of Table of Cases 0.232** 0.128** -0.149*
(0.0338) (0.0424) (0.0647)
Log Positive Cites Per Opinion 0.177** -0.0437 -0.104+
(0.0373) (0.0532) (0.0529)
Log Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 0.143** 0.256** 0.127
(0.0398) (0.0761) (0.0767)
Log Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.0629** 0.218** 0.0664
(0.0213) (0.0471) (0.0436)
Log Discuss Cites Per Opinion 0.0994** 0.0345 -0.0218
(0.0288) (0.0376) (0.0445)
Log Quoted Cites Per Opinion 0.115** 0.0917 -0.0465
(0.0328) (0.0587) (0.0547)
Log Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion 0.0418 0.0841 -0.00112
(0.0330) (0.0525) (0.0424)
Log Cases Overruled -0.105* -0.0216 -0.0987
(0.0476) (0.0837) (0.0965)
Log Cases Superseded by Statute 0.112* 0.0481 0.170*
(0.0429) (0.0840) (0.0754)
N= 15,486 judge-years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p 
< .001. Each row includes coefficients from a regression that includes a year fixed effect, judge fixed effect, 
and state time trend. The baseline effect is a dummy for the ten years after a policy change, and the effect is 
relative to a baseline that includes the ten years before and after the policy change. Partial Discretion gives 
the estimate for the treatment dummy interacted with a dummy for states with partial discretion in case 
selection. Mandatory Review gives the estimate for the treatment dummy interacted with a dummy for states 
with fully mandatory review. Therefore the second and third column give effects that are relative to the states 
in the first column.
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TABLE 7.1
Effect of Reform: Partisan Contested Elections to Uncontested Elections (9 States)
Outcome Variable (1) (2) (3)
Log Number of Majority Opinions Written 0.164 0.0542 -0.0113
(0.153) (0.121) (0.144)
Log Number of Dissents Written 0.224 0.00786 -0.0646
(0.158) (0.145) (0.109)
Log Number of Concurrences Written 0.280* 0.11 0.0261
(0.104) (0.0742) (0.0530)
Log Total Words Written 0.0679 -0.0115 -0.0963
(0.0976) (0.101) (0.123)
Log Average Length of Majority Opinion -0.0831 -0.0343 -0.0431
(0.123) (0.0605) (0.0396)
Log Average Length of Table of Cases -0.0487 -0.0277 -0.087
(0.202) (0.0923) (0.0569)
Log Positive Cites Per Opinion 0.203 -0.0322 -0.117*
(0.220) (0.0737) (0.0475)
Log Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion -0.073 -0.0765 -0.112+
(0.219) (0.0945) (0.0638)
Log Negative Cites Per Opinion -0.0914 -0.0659 -0.0727
(0.125) (0.0596) (0.0490)
Log Discuss Cites Per Opinion 0.131 -0.0303 -0.0611*
(0.147) (0.0368) (0.0262)
Log Quoted Cites Per Opinion 0.00445 -0.0136 -0.0608+
(0.191) (0.0543) (0.0344)
Log Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion 0.106 -0.0259 -0.0456*
(0.114) (0.0336) (0.0178)
Log Cases Overruled 0.0555 0.0289 0.0182
(0.0775) (0.0305) (0.0338)
Log Cases Superseded by Statute -0.177+ -0.0574 -0.0812
(0.0964) (0.0532) (0.0501)
Fixed Effects None State Judge
Trends None State State
N= 15,486 judge-years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p 
< .001. Each coefficient is from a separate regression that includes a year fixed effect. The treatment variable 
is a dummy for the ten years after a policy change, and the effect is relative to a baseline that includes the ten 
years before and after the policy change. Treatment dummies include an interaction with whether the court 
has partial discretion or fully mandatory review.
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TABLE 7.2
Effect of Partisan to Uncontested Election Reform by Level of Review Discretion
Outcome Variable Baseline Effect Partial Discretion Mandatory Review
(9 states) (4 states) (0 states)
Log Number of Majority Opinions Written -0.0113 0.0866
(0.144) (0.133)
Log Number of Dissents Written -0.0646 0.227+
(0.109) (0.131)
Log Number of Concurrences Written 0.0261 0.0468
(0.0530) (0.116)
Log Total Words Written -0.0963 0.147
(0.123) (0.112)
Log Average Length of Majority Opinion -0.0431 0.0162
(0.0396) (0.0503)
Log Average Length of Table of Cases -0.087 0.143*
(0.0569) (0.0654)
Log Positive Cites Per Opinion -0.117* 0.156
(0.0475) (0.111)
Log Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion -0.112+ 0.0872
(0.0638) (0.0872)
Log Negative Cites Per Opinion -0.0727 0.0752
(0.0490) (0.0546)
Log Discuss Cites Per Opinion -0.0611* 0.0593
(0.0262) (0.0575)
Log Quoted Cites Per Opinion -0.0608+ 0.0299
(0.0344) (0.0487)
Log Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion -0.0456* 0.0584
(0.0178) (0.0365)
Log Cases Overruled 0.0182 0.0821
(0.0338) (0.0687)
Log Cases Superseded by Statute -0.0812 0.122*
(0.0501) (0.0578)
N= 15,486 judge-years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p 
< .001. Each row includes coefficients from a regression that includes a year fixed effect, judge fixed effect, 
and state time trend. The baseline effect is a dummy for the ten years after a policy change, and the effect is 
relative to a baseline that includes the ten years before and after the policy change. Partial Discretion gives 
the estimate for the treatment dummy interacted with a dummy for states with partial discretion in case 
selection. Mandatory Review gives the estimate for the treatment dummy interacted with a dummy for states 
with fully mandatory review. Therefore the second and third column give effects that are relative to the states 
in the first column.
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TABLE 8.1
Effect of Being up for Election By Election System
State Fixed Effects and State Trends Judge Fixed Effects and State Trends
(NP1) (P1) (U1) (NP2) (P2) (U2) (NP3) (P3) (U3)
Log Number of Majority Opinions Written -0.150* -0.125** 0.198** -0.227* -0.153** 0.129* -0.255+ -0.129** 0.091
(0.0649) (0.0242) (0.0424) (0.105) (0.0255) (0.0473) (0.133) (0.0162) (0.0899)
Log Number of Dissents Written -0.140+ -0.116** 0.0228 -0.151** -0.0852 -0.0395 -0.148* -0.081 -0.115
(0.0693) (0.0348) (0.0212) (0.0466) (0.0581) (0.0305) (0.0597) (0.0553) (0.0836)
Log Number of Concurrences Written -0.0669 -0.00757 0.111** -0.0595* 0.0222 0.0349 -0.0477 0.0229 0.0547
(0.120) (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0227) (0.0280) (0.0460) (0.0431) (0.0303) (0.0601)
Log Total Words Written -0.0784 -0.207** 0.138** -0.191* -0.217** 0.108** -0.210* -0.211** 0.0654
(0.0495) (0.0248) (0.0342) (0.0746) (0.0407) (0.0375) (0.102) (0.0259) (0.0860)
Log Average Length of Majority Opinion 0.074 -0.03 -0.0379 0.0598 -0.0479* -0.012 0.052 -0.0611** 0.00228
(0.0613) (0.0227) (0.0494) (0.0356) (0.0205) (0.0136) (0.0358) (0.0205) (0.00350)
Log Average Length of Table of Cases 0.0341 -0.0425 0.0162 0.00985 -0.0556 0.0246+ 0.0232 -0.0494 0.0231+
(0.0679) (0.0397) (0.0333) (0.0472) (0.0405) (0.0139) (0.0471) (0.0319) (0.0138)
Log Positive Cites Per Opinion 0.0688 -0.00632 0.0379 0.0282 -0.0668** 0.0264 0.0386 -0.0617 -0.000557
(0.0928) (0.0298) (0.0548) (0.0428) (0.0214) (0.0323) (0.0692) (0.0428) (0.0321)
Log Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 0.0437 -0.0301 0.0307 0.0298 -0.0547+ 0.03 0.000722 -0.0587** 0.00588
(0.0693) (0.0193) (0.0856) (0.0530) (0.0273) (0.0500) (0.0439) (0.0213) (0.0464)
Log Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.0212** 0.000577 0.0113 0.0234* -0.0116 0.0169 0.0330** -0.0297 -0.00336
(0.00678) (0.0147) (0.0349) (0.0106) (0.0184) (0.0224) (0.0125) (0.0197) (0.0262)
State-Year Fixed Effects and Judge 
Fixed Effects
Notes. N= 9,502 judge-years. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. See notes in Table 8.1 (cont.).
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TABLE 8.1 (cont.)
Effect of Being up for Election By Election System (cont.)
State Fixed Effects and State Trends Judge Fixed Effects and State Trends
(NP1) (P1) (U1) (NP2) (P2) (U2) (NP3) (P3) (U3)
Log Discuss Cites Per Opinion 0.032 -0.0452** 0.0339 0.0172 -0.0716** 0.0252 0.0211 -0.0751* 0.0173
(0.0612) (0.0117) (0.0461) (0.0345) (0.0197) (0.0411) (0.0502) (0.0300) (0.0433)
Log Quoted Cites Per Opinion 0.0461 -0.0269 0.0149 0.0304 -0.0646* 0.0155 0.0312 -0.0546** -0.0155
(0.0756) (0.0183) (0.0486) (0.0383) (0.0236) (0.0244) (0.0504) (0.0210) (0.0287)
Log Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion 0.0557 -0.0412* 0.0287 0.0585* -0.0402* 0.0362 0.0224 -0.0361+ 0.0534+
(0.0410) (0.0196) (0.0354) (0.0227) (0.0163) (0.0251) (0.0489) (0.0204) (0.0278)
Log Cases Overruled -0.08 -0.00105 0.207 -0.122 -0.0077 0.211 -0.0474 0.0101 0.207
(0.0724) (0.0282) (0.156) (0.0873) (0.0305) (0.167) (0.0852) (0.0209) (0.260)
Log Cases Superseded by Statute 0.0151 -0.0364 0.126* -0.0292 -0.0587 0.110** -0.0538 -0.03 0.014
(0.0218) (0.0340) (0.0469) (0.0381) (0.0426) (0.0329) (0.0797) (0.0574) (0.0329)
State-Year Fixed Effects and Judge 
Fixed Effects
Notes. N= 9,502 judge-years. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Each coefficient is from a separate regression that includes 
a year fixed effect. The treatment variable is a dummy that equals one in years that a judge is facing re-election and zero otherwise. Regression contains interaction 
terms between treatment and level of review discretion. Sample is restricted to state-years with non-partisan (NP), partisan (P), and uncontested (U) elections, where 
the courts follow random or rotating assignment of cases. The sample includes 104 non-partisan elections for 66 judges in 9 states, 208 partisan elections for 114 
judges in 10 states, and 77 uncontested elections for 51 judges in 7 states. State supreme court elections take place in the first week of November.
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TABLE 8.2
Electoral Cycle Effect by Election System and Appellate Review Standard
Non-Partisan Contested Elections Partisan Contested Elections Uncontested Elections
Outcome Variable
Log Number of Majority Opinions Written -0.255+ 0.430** 0.225 -0.129** 0.131 0.091 0.0801 -0.398*
(0.133) (0.133) (0.153) (0.0162) (0.137) (0.0899) (0.142) (0.182)
Log Number of Dissents Written -0.148* 0.0735 0.141 -0.081 0.132 -0.115 0.212+ -0.134
(0.0597) (0.223) (0.227) (0.0553) (0.165) (0.0836) (0.117) (0.373)
Log Number of Concurrences Written -0.0477 -0.0813 0.115* 0.0229 -0.267** 0.0547 0.207 -0.367**
(0.0431) (0.114) (0.0541) (0.0303) (0.0842) (0.0601) (0.153) (0.0637)
Log Total Words Written -0.210* 0.316** 0.191 -0.211** 0.174 0.0654 0.0771 -0.461
(0.102) (0.104) (0.130) (0.0259) (0.169) (0.0860) (0.0876) (0.365)
Log Average Length of Majority Opinion 0.052 -0.105** -0.0308 -0.0611** 0.0213 0.00228 -0.0929 -0.0522
(0.0358) (0.0375) (0.0456) (0.0205) (0.0305) (0.00350) (0.131) (0.0881)
Log Average Length of Table of Cases 0.0232 -0.113* 0.0361 -0.0494 0.0157 0.0231+ -0.154 -0.042
(0.0471) (0.0485) (0.0591) (0.0319) (0.0606) (0.0138) (0.0965) (0.0997)
Log Positive Cites Per Opinion 0.0386 -0.200* -0.0203 -0.0617 0.0275 -0.000557 -0.128 -0.024
(0.0692) (0.0947) (0.0736) (0.0428) (0.0479) (0.0321) (0.231) (0.0576)
Log Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 0.000722 -0.0151 0.114+ -0.0587** 0.0352 0.00588 -0.303 -0.0913
(0.0439) (0.0804) (0.0593) (0.0213) (0.0334) (0.0464) (0.314) (0.155)
Log Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.0330** -0.0841** -0.0323* -0.0297 0.0142 -0.00336 -0.141 -0.0513+



















Notes. N= 9,502 judge-years. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. See notes in Table 8.2 (cont.).
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TABLE 8.2 (cont.)
Electoral Cycle Effect by Election System and Appellate Review Standard (cont.)
Non-Partisan Contested Elections Partisan Contested Elections Uncontested Elections
Outcome Variable
Log Discuss Cites Per Opinion 0.0211 -0.0892 0.00984 -0.0751* 0.0714* 0.0173 -0.0402 -0.0606
(0.0502) (0.0601) (0.0584) (0.0300) (0.0311) (0.0433) (0.0871) (0.0435)
Log Quoted Cites Per Opinion 0.0312 -0.156* 0.00233 -0.0546** 0.0349 -0.0155 -0.0891 0.0995**
(0.0504) (0.0734) (0.0580) (0.0210) (0.0257) (0.0287) (0.184) (0.0287)
Log Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion 0.0224 -0.04 0.025 -0.0361+ 0.0373 0.0534+ -0.148 -0.225
(0.0489) (0.0643) (0.0507) (0.0204) (0.0438) (0.0278) (0.242) (0.139)
Log Cases Overruled -0.0474 -0.14 -0.0303 0.0101 0.0614+ 0.207 -0.45 -0.112
(0.0852) (0.113) (0.101) (0.0209) (0.0323) (0.260) (0.572) (0.311)
Log Cases Superseded by Statute -0.0538 0.143 0.106 -0.03 0.121 0.014 -0.231 -0.131



















N= 12,405 judge-years. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Each coefficient is from a separate regression that includes a state-
year fixed effect and judge fixed effect. The treatment variable is a dummy that equals one in years that a judge is facing re-election and zero otherwise. Regression 
contains interaction terms between treatment and level of review discretion. Sample is restricted to state-years with non-partisan (NP), partisan (P), and uncontested 
(U) elections, where the courts follow random or rotating assignment of cases. The sample includes 104 non-partisan elections for 66 judges in 9 states, 208 partisan 
elections for 114 judges in 10 states, and 77 uncontested elections for 51 judges in 7 states. State supreme court elections take place in the first week of November.
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